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TAKINGS1 : A RETURN TO PRINCIPLE 
Private property and public law : when the state takes, who 
benefits and who pays? 
1 
A 
INTRODUCTION 
Examples of Uncompensated Takings l 
The Government proposed in 1997 under the Maori 
Reserved Land Act to alter the property rights of statutory 
lessees by changing the review terms and removing the right of 
perpetual renewal. Farmers claimed a capital loss of $59m. 
There was fierce political opposition. A by election was 
pending. Eventually $67m in compensation was paid. 
The Government under the Fisheries Act proposes that 
fishers should exchange the property right under fishing 
permit to catch 100% of Schedule 4 fish for quota to only 80% 
of the Schedule 4 fish on the argument that the quota property 
right is superior to a fishing permit. The Primary Production 
Select Committee has deferred a decision until after the 
election. 
The Government and agencies often exceed statutory 
time limits for processing of applications under the Resource 
Management Act and other legislation.
2 These are uncompensated 
takings of the citizen's time and opportunities. 
The Government in 1993 under the Customs Regulations 
removed the rights of Landowners to export native timber. 
Although no right to compensation was conceded, some ex gratia 
"adjustment assistance" has now been paid. 
The Historic Places Trust in 1994 first asked the South 
Wairarapa District Council for a plan change to make 
discretionary all land use within 200m of "suspected" historic · 
Maori sites/waahi tapu. Valuable opportunities to diversify 
into aquaculture or rural residential subdivision will be 
taken from the Farmer. No compensation is proposed. 
1 "Takings" is a term from United States jurisprudence 
originating in Magna Carta to describe all State interference 
with private property. In England and New Zealand the term 
"compulsory acquisition" is more frequent. In Canada the term 
"expropriation" is used since the word is common to both 
French and English . 
l 
July 1999 survey of local authorities by Mfe finding 
that 22% of all resource consent applications are not 
processed within the statutory time limits, despite Councils 
being able to arbitrarily declare when an application is 
"officially received". The accuracy of Council response is 
not audited. Council requests for additional information 
under s92(4) RMA are often used to justify delay. 
The 1999 proposed plan for the Banks Peninsular 2 
District declares over 90% of some farms to be "Significant 
Natural Areas" (SNAs) in ~hich all activities including 
vegetation removal are discretionary. No compensation is 
proposed. 
B Abstract 
Since Magna Carta 1215 and earlier the English Common 
Law has required that compensation be paid for all takings. 
That has always been an essential check on the power of the 
Executive. From guaranteed property rights, the concept of 
prompt due process of law and individual liberties have 
progressively developed. In recent times the importance of 
property rights in the constitution has been forgotten as the 
power of the Parliamentary Executive has grown. As the power 
of the Executive, (the Crown) in Parliament has grown, 
Parliament has neglected its historic function as guarantor of 
individual liberties and property rights. 
This paper reviews the authorities for the inherent 
right of the citizen to compensation for all takings. The 
influence of Magna Carta3 in the Magna Carta legislation, the 
Petition and Bill of Rights, the Common Law (the Ancient 
Constitution) and modern caselaw is discussed. Section 21 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990, giving domestic effect to 
international law, is considered as a further authority for 
the constitutional protection of property rights. The paper 
then examines current practice and statutory provision for 
compensation and contrasts the full compensation generally 
paid under the Public Works Act for land with inadequate 
provision for other property. 
The conclusion is that at common law full compensation 
was always paid and that all statute law should provide for 
compensation, unless there are sound policy reasons to deny 
compensation. The citizen's right to compensation is a 
constitutional convention. The right can extend to regulatory 
takings. 
More fundamentally this paper concludes that New 
Zealand since 1840 has had a written constitution grounded in 
property rights and the philosophy of John Locke. This was 
the orthodox view until last century, when the positivists 
(such as Austin and AV Dicey) argued that Parliament was 
supreme and could make such law as it wished. Discussion of 
the full constitutional ramifications lies outside the ambit 
of this paper. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, 
footnotes and annexures) comprises approximately 14,000 words. 
The text comprises approx. 16,000 words including footnotes. 
"Magna Carta" is used throughout these paper as a 
general term for all the Magna Carta legislation and Magna 
Carta principles refined in the Common Law. 
II THE ENGLISH RULES BASED ON MAGNA CARTA 3 
A The Constitutional authority for compensation is Magna 
Carta 
Courts at the highest level and writers throughout the 
Commonwealth have consistently recognised Magna Carta as the 
constitutional authority that full compensation should always 
be paid for all takings by the Crown whether of land or 
intangible property. 4 
stated 
Justice Baragwanath in Cooper v Attorney General5 
Our constitutional safeguard for property rights 
is that of Ch 29 of Magna Carta : 
"No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or 
disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or 
free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or 
any other wise destroyed; nor will we not pass 
upon him, nor [condemn, (1)] 6 but by the lawful 
4 Writers include : 
Matthew Parris Sir John Fortescue Sir Edward Coke Selden 
Edmund Burke Stubbs Sir Winston Churchill : 
History of the English Speaking Peoples Vol 1 Cassell 1956 202 
"And when in subsequent ages the State, swollen with its own 
authority, has attempted to ride roughshod over the rights or 
liberties of the subject it is to this doctrine that appeal 
has again and again been made, and never, as yet, without 
success." 
Courts include 
Canada Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia 
34 DLR (3d) 145 (SC) per Judson J at 173 lines 31-36 
"the expropriation of private rights by the Government under 
the prerogative necessitates the payment of compensation ... 
Only express words ... in an enactment would authorise a taking 
without compensation" and 203 line 28 refers to Magna Carta 
Australia Ex parte Walsh and Johnson [1925] CLR 36 HCA 
per Isaacs J at 79 lines 5-34 
Cooper v Attorney General [1996] 3NZLR 480 BaragwanathJ 
6 Chapter 29 in the 1225 reissue of Magna Carta resulted 
from the consolidation of Chapters 39 and 40 in the original 
1215 charter. The word [condemnl] is footnoted in the 
Statutes of the Realm (the official statutes mentioned in the 
First Schedule to the 1988 Imperial Laws Application Act) to 
record that "the latin word mittemus while literally 
translated as send or deal with, is usually rendered as 
above''. It has connotations of "target" or "set out to 
destroy". For that reason certain torts against public 
officials such as the tort of misfeasance in public office 
have a requirement of malice. (As to malice see Todd (ed) "The 
Law of Torts in New Zealand" Brookers Ltd 1997 at 1015) 
That raises the issue as to whether private remedies 
in tort are merely the Court's practical recognition of the 
inherent rights of the individual to protection of his person 
and property guaranteed by the Magna Carta legislation. 
A further question is whether mittemus authorises a 
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land." 4 
[We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer 
to any man either Justice or Right] (Imperial Laws 
Application Act 1988, s 3(1) and First Schedule) 1 
In Russel v Minister of Lands8 a full bench of four 
Judges of the New Zealand Supreme Court declared in 1898 
through Pennefather J : 
It has even been suggested that, although the 
Legislature provides for full compensation, 
yet the Compensation Court should award a 
smaller amount in the case of lands taken for 
settlement, as otherwise the bargain would not 
be a profitable one for the Government. To do so 
would be to violate the fundamental provision of 
Magna Carta "No freeman shall be disseised of his 
tenement except by the law of the land." 
Blackstone in the "Commentaries on the Laws of 
England" 9 (first published in 1765) wrote: 
The third absolute right inherent in every 
Englishman, is that of property: which 
consists in the free use, enjoyment and 
disposal of all his acquisitions, without 
any control or diminution, save only by 
the laws of the land 
Upon this principle the Great Charter has 
declared that no freeman shall be disseised, 
or divested, of his freehold or of his liberties, 
or free customs, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land 
So great moreover is the regard for private 
property, that .... If a new road, for instance, 
were to be made through the grounds of a private 
person, it might perhaps be extensively 
beneficial to the public; but the law permits no 
man, or set of men to do this without the consent 
of the owner of the land 
the legislature alone can .... compel the individual 
remedy in tort with compensation for injurious affection or 
metaphysical taking in the sense of Cockburn v Minister of 
Works [1984] 2 NZLR 466 CA 
Chapter 29 was cited in abbreviated form in Cooper. 
For convenience it is now set out in full, including the words 
in square brackets. 
Russel v Minister of Lands (1898) 17 NZLR 241 at 250 
9 "Commentaries on the Laws of England" Vol 1 121-123 3ed 
RM Kerr London J Murray 1862 . The influence of Locke is clear. 
to acquiesce .... Not by absolutely stripping the 5 
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; 
but by giving him a full indemnification and 
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained .... even 
this is an exercise of power, which the legislature 
indulges with caution, and which nothing but the 
legislature can perform. 
in vain would these rights be declared ... if the 
constitution provided no other method to secure 
their enjoyment.... These are ... 
1 .. Parliament ... 
2 .. [Strict] limitation of the royal prerogative .. 
3 .. Applying to the courts of justice for redress 
"Magna Carta'' or more accurately the Magna Carta 
legislation has been reissued on innumerable occasions since 
1215 generally on the accession of a new monarch. The right 
to rule was always known to be conditional on the guarantee of 
the fundamental freedoms and liberties. The freedoms and 
liberties were reserved fundamental rights in the individual, 
his person, his liberty, property and customs. 
The first Magna Carta signed on June 15, 1215 in a 
marshy field at Runnymede was a peace treaty between the Crown 
and a broad alliance of rebels. The Crown had been militarily 
defeated, when the City of London opened its gates to the 
Barons, so denying John the ability to raise cash for his 
mercenaries from the London merchants. The previously 
arbitrary authority of the Norman Kings was limited by the 
guarantees of liberties to the Church (article 1), the Barons 
and Freemen (arts 2-12,14-54), the City of London (art 13), 
the Welsh (art 56-58) and the Scots (art 59). The Crown's 
obligation to respect the liberties and freedoms guaranteed by 
Magna Carta was immediately understood to mean that the Crown 
and Subject alike were under the Rule of Law. That accorded 
with the mediaeval concept that since everyone was subject to 
God they should equally be subject to the law sanctioned by 
God. 
The peoples10 of England had by cession and conquest 
regained part of their sovereignty in the form of the 
guarantees of their freedoms and liberties. That 
interpretation cannot be denied in view of art 61, providing 
that the elected Council of 25 barons were free to distress 
and distrain against the lands, castles and possessions of the 
Crown if the King had not remedied any breach after 40 days 
notice. 
10 There were many peoples in England under Norman French 
rule each with their distinct languages, traditions and legal 
systems. These included the various Celts, the Jutes, the 
Kents, the Angles, the Saxons and the free Scandinavian 
settlers along the East Coast. All welcomed Magna Carta as a 
Crown promise to respect their particular customs. The 
concern is strikingly similiar to contemporary Maori concern 
for preservation of taonga and biculturalism. 
Compare n 25 Prof Brookfield: the legitimation of power. 
Contrary to popular misconception the Barons 6 
mentioned in Magna Carta were not necessarily nobles, but 
merely military leaders. 11 Unusually for the age Article 60 
provided that the benefit of the customs and liberties would 
extend to all freemen. All the "liberties, rights and 
concessions" in Magna Carta were granted "for ever" 12 ("in 
perpetuum" in the original latin text). The obligations were 
also to be "observed in good faith and without evil intent" 
(bona fide et sine malo ingenio). It is interesting to 
compare the language with Richardson Jin Attorney General v 
New Zealand Maori Council 13 772 years later. 
B The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 reaffirms Magna Carta 
The Treaty is at the same time a reaffirmation of 
Magna Carta and the authority under which the Maori people 
acceded to British sovereignty grounded in Magna Carta. The 
Third Article states that the Queen ''extends to the Natives of 
New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the 
Rights and Privileges of British Subjects". Those rights were 
Magna Carta rights. Henry and William Williams in translating 
the Treaty to Maori, were influenced by Magna Carta since the 
Bill of Rights 1689 was still recent history and a part of 
English popular culture . 14 
11 F Maitland "The Constitutional History of England" 1 
ed 1963 Cambridge Univ Press 65 line 20 states that "it would 
seem that at this time the title baron covered all the 
military tenants in chief of the crown" 
12 The phrase is discussed by JC Holt in "The Roots of 
Liberty'' Edit Sandoz Univ of Missouri Press 1993 34 line 18 
to 35. Line 27 " ... a grant in perpetuity was unusual between 
laymen .. . .... repetition of the phrase reflected a 
determination that there was to be no going back, a feeling 
that these were once and for all concessions which at last put 
a wide range matters to rights." 
13 Attorney General v New Zealand Maori Council [1987] 
NZLR 641 CA Richardson J at 673 line 48 "For its part the 
Crown sought legitimacy from the indigenous people for its 
acquisition of sovereignty and in return gave certain 
guarantees. That basis for the compact requires each party to 
act reasonably and in good faith towards each other." 
14 The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography on Henry 
Williams Volume 1 (594 line 27) mirrors general historical and 
political opinion in stating" ... his Maori version of the 
treaty was not a literal translation from the English draft 
and did not convey clearly the cession of sovereignty." 
Such opinion is unfair in that it does not consider 
the political and social context of key words such as 
"sovereignty" and "land". I find support for this view in 
1 Dr PG M'Hugh "The Historiography of New Zealand's 
Constitutional History" 344 at 363-367 published in essays on 
the Constitution ed PA Joseph. Brooker's 1995 
2 Dr R Epstein "Indigenous People's Rights and the 
A legitimate interpretation of the Maori version 7 
of the Treaty is that the promises of the Second Article given 
to the Chiefs and their hapu ("ki nga hapu") were also 
extended to all the people of New Zealand of whatever race 
( 
11 - ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani 11 ) • 15 That accords with 
Magna Carta and modern concepts of the equality of everyone 
under the law. 16 
C Magna Carta part of the Fundamental Law in New Zealand 
Magna Carta has always been an official part of the 
law of New Zealand. The principle of full inheiritance 
11 
was affirmed in the English Laws Act 1858. 
1 The laws of England as existing on the [14 
day of January, 1840] shall, as far as applicable 
to the circumstances of the said Colony of New 
Zealand, be deemed and taken to have been in force 
therein on and after that day, and shall continue 
to be therein applied in the administration of 
justice accordingly. 
The 1854 and 1908 English Laws Acts were in similiar 
language . The proviso "so far as applicable to the 
circumstances of New Zealand" left doubt as to which of the 
Imperial statutes applied. 
The 1879 Revision of Statutes Act resulted in the 
publication in 1881 under the authority of the New Zealand 
Government of "A Selection of the Imperial Acts of Parliament 
Treaty of Waitangi" a lecture given at the Institute of Policy 
Studies and the Stout Centre VUW on 25 March 1999 
" ... legal archaeology .... was indeed a strong Lockean document, 
which is the more congenial because Lockeans did not thi nk 
that title started with the Crown and worked its way down to 
the people through feudal conveyances. People like Hobson and 
the missionaries may not have been sophisticated, but at least 
t hey were reasonably familiar with current political ideas . " 
15 The linguistic issues are important since the Court of 
Appeal in the New Zealand Council v Attorney General cases 
placed great importance on them . Eg [1987] 1 NZLR 641 
Cooke Pat 660-668 esp 662 line 28 to 663 line 44 
Richardson J 671 line 24 to 672 line 32 
Bisson J 713 line 5 to 715 line 26 
See also 
"Waitangi Maori & Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of 
Waitangi" Ed IH Kawharu esp Bruce Biggs at 300 
"Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand" PA 
Joseph Law Book Company. 
16 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Arts 2,7,21 
to which NZ is a State Signatory. 
11 Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand 
PA Joseph The Law Book Company 1993 Sydney at 13 line 18. 
apparently in force in New Zealand .... " This included Mag
na 8 
Carta 1297, the Petition of Right 1627 and the Bill of Ri
ghts 
1689. 18 
The Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 removed 
all doubt. Section 3 declared that all Imperial enactment
s in 
the First Schedule are "part of the laws of New Zealand", 
while enactments not listed are excluded. Extracts from t
he 
Magna Carta legislation (and the Petition of Right and Bi
ll of 
Rights 1688) are listed as "Constitutional Enactments" . 
Clearly Parliament passes legislation to have effect and 
it is 
hard to perceive the useful purpose of a reaffirmation of
 the 
Magna Carta legislation if it is to have no constitutiona
l 
effect in the interpretation and administration of the law
. 
Section 5 of the Imperial Laws Application Act stated: 
After the commencement of this Act, the common 
law of England (including the principles and 
rules of equity) so far as it was part of the 
laws of New Zealand immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, shall continue to be 
part of the laws of New Zealand . 
That proviso preserves the great body of Judge made casela
w 
ultimately founded on Magna Carta principles determined b
y the 
House of Lords and Privy Council .
18 
D The Fiduciary Duties of the Crown from Magna Carta 
Fiduciary duty is the concept drawn from the law of 
equity that those exercising authority should behave with
 the 
utmost good faith to everyone vulnerable to an abuse of t
hat 
authority. It is similiar to the trustee/beneficiary 
relationship. 
Magna Carta 3o EDWARD, I. AD 1275 (First Schedule of 
the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988) is the Parliament
ary 
authority for fiduciary duty (and the equality of all und
er 
the law . ) 
FIRST the King willeth and commandeth, That 
the Peace of Holy Church and of the Land, be 
well kept and maintained in all points, and 
that common Right be done to all, as well 
Poor as Rich, without respect of Persons . 
18 Section III was omitted from the reprint of the Bill 
of Rights 1688. This omission is later discussed at III 
B. 
In their preface to the 1881 reprint at iv the 
Commissioners remark that "the omission of any such enactm
ent 
is not equivalent to an authoritative affirmation that it
 is 
not in force or applicable." 
18 The history of the Imperial legislation in New 
Zealand is described in Law Commission Report No 1 "Imper
ial 
Legislation in force in New Zealand" and the Commentary i
n RS 
Volume 30 reprinting at 1 Nov 1994 all the Imperial 
Legislation recognised by the New Zealand Government as 
remaining in force. 
The belief in Crown benevolence, now expressed 9 
as the fiduciary duty is of ancient origin and 
can be traced to the laws of the Anglo Saxons. 
19 
Traditionally in the context of takings fiduciary duty 
includes all the courtesies and good faith required of the 
Crown in persuading Landowners to voluntarily leave their 
land. It necessarily includes the desirability to negotiate 
in good faith to reach a voluntary bargain in preference to 
litigation or other measures of State coercion.
20 
The fiduciary duty was described by Richardson Jin 
NZ Maori Council v Attorney General
21 in the context of the 
State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 as requiring good faith and 
reasonable behaviour. 
Since the acquisition of limited sovereignty by the 
Crown under the various reissues of Magna Carta and under the 
Treaty of Waitangi are essentially the same, similiar 
fiduciary duties should apply. 
III THE PETITION OF RIGHT 1627 AND BILL OF RIGHTS 1689 
22 
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 1689 
The Bill of Rights (Act) 1689 was Parliament's 
response to the Petition of Right 1627 formally accepted by 
Charles 1 in the Round Parliament and then by subsequent 
action repudiated. That repudiation lead to the English Civil 
War. Both the Petition of Right and Bill of Rights 1689 
remain part of the law of New Zealand under the First Schedule 
to the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. Together they are 
commonly said to be the authority for the Supremacy of 
Parliament as law of the land. The history of both is plainly 
told by Winston Churchill "A History of the English Speaking 
Peoples 11 23 
19 Ancient Laws and Institutes of England Vol 1 1840 
Commissions of the Public Records of the Kingdom 
20 The sole purchaser "friendly negotiation" test 
originating in Glass v Inland Revenue [1915) SC 449 and Raja 
Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v The Revenue Divisional 
Officer Vizagapatam [1939) AC 302 JC, 318 line 3 was applied 
in Turner v Minister of Public Instruction [1956) 95 CLR 245, 
Tawharanui Farm Ltd v Auckland Regional Authority [1976) 2NZLR 
230,235 and discussed and affirmed in Jacobsen Holdings v 
Drexel [1986) 1 NZLR 324 CA Cooke P 328 lns 8-12, 329 lns4,50, 
Somers J 334 lns 15-20, Casey J 335 line 39 and then remitted 
to the HC [1987) 2 NZLR 52 Pritchard J 54 lns23-40 
Also S18(d) P Works Act 1981 requires good faith negotiation. 
21 
22 
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General Above n13 
Commonly year numbered 1688,but in fact passed in 1689 
23 "A History of the English Speaking Peoples" Cassell 
and Company 1956 Volume II 119-327. 
For England at the time the Declaration of Rights 10 
13 February 1689 was more important since the Lords, Commons 
and Monarch assembled together while it was read and then the 
Crown was formally offered to William and Mary. The 
Declaration was a constitutional instrument. 
A Parliament is Subject to the Law 
The claimed supremacy of Parliament 
Parliament is not "supreme", 24 since its authority is 
limited by the fundamental liberties of the person, of 
property and of prompt due process reaffirmed by the Bill of 
Rights 1689. Parliament took power in the self proclaimed 
"Glorious Revolution" conditional upon those liberties, which 
have never been removed by a later revolution or broad 
consultation of the people. 25 The right to full compensation 
for all takings in the Westminster model of democracy is and 
always has been the most effective check to the inevitably 
despotic power of the State. It has often been overlooked by 
political commentators arguing for limited government.
26 
24 Contrary to the views of AV Dicey "An Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution" 10 ed 1975 Macmillan 
Press. Dicey's view of the Petition of Right and the Bill of 
Rights is expressed in a footnote at 200: 
"The Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights, as also the 
American Declarations of Rights , contain . .. proclamations of 
general principles .. . . . judicial condemnations of claims or 
practices on the part of the Crown, which are thereby 
pronounced illegal. It will be found that .. . . nearly every , 
clause ... negatives some distinct claim made on behalf of the 
prerogative . . . .. " Dicey does however concede the role of 
interpretation. Dicey's views are now untenable in the UK 
following the UK accession to the EEC. See R v Secretary of 
State for Transport exp Factortame [1988] 1 ALL ER 735 
25 The requirement for "common consent" to a new 
constitution was satisfied for the new South African 
constitution by widespread consultation from 1993 to 1996. 
Compare with the minimal consultation (10 submissions 
received) when the NZ Constitution Act 1986 was passed. 
Fundamental legal rights can also develop by peaceful 
acquiescence. This was argued in the context of Moana 
Jackson's radical claims for Maori sovereignty by Professor 
Brookfield "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom- Millenial 
Hopes and Speculations" "The Legitimation of Imposed Power" 
44-49 in "Essays on the Constitution" ed PA Joseph Brookers 
1995. Respect for custom is consistent with Magna Carta . The 
question remains however as to what period of time must elapse 
before a "prescriptive" constitutional custom can be 
recognised. 
26 eg Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
"Unbridled Power" 1 ed 1979 and 2 ed 1987 
"Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP" 
3ed 1997 Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer All NZ Oxford Univ Press. 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon21 11 
Chief Justice Wild in 1976 in Fitzgerald v Muldoon 
confirmed that the Executive in Parliament was subject to the 
law and the Bill of Rights 1689. He declared that Mr Muldoon 
had breached the Bill of Rights 1689 ("the pretended power to 
suspend the law") by announcing that contributions to 
Government Superannuation should cease before Parliament had 
changed the law. By direct analogy Parliament must be subject 
to all the provisions of the Bill of Rights including the 
omitted Section III guaranteeing all the liberties of property 
and the individual. 
Reaffirmation of the rights and liberties of the subject from 
Magna Carta 
The Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights are 
written in such blunt language that they make no sense unless 
they are recognised as reserved fundamental law binding the 
Crown Executive in Parliament to comply with Magna Carta and 
accepted by the Crown as fundamental law. 
1 The Petition recites 250 EdwI c29 1297 (identical to 
Hen.3 M. C.c.29) in Section 3 and 280 Edw III in Section 4 . It 
also refers to "the laws" and "customs" of "this realm" 
(section 2 and 7) and "the Great Charter and the laws of the 
land" (section 7). 
2 The preambles to the Petition of Right and Bill of 
Rights dictate a purposive interpretation premised on Magna 
Carta. 
The preamble to the Petition of Right reads 
The Petition ...... concerning divers Rights and 
Liberties of the Subjects, with the King's Majesty's 
Royal Answer thereunto in full Parliament.
20 
The First Preamble to the Bill of Rights reads 
An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the 
subject, and settling the succession of the Crown. 
27 Fitzgerald V Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 Wild CJ 
The restrictions on parliamentary law making are further 
discussed by David M'Gee in The Legislative Process and the 
Courts 84-111 in Essays on the Constitution ed PA Joseph 
Brooker's 1995. M'Gee's discussion was expressly approved by 
the Court of Appeal in Shaw v Shaw CA 218/97 at 5 line 6 
"Parliament is subject to law just like every other person and 
body in New Zealand; it is bound by statutory requirements." 
Also Prebble v TVNZ 3 [1993]3NZLR CA and [1994]3NZLR 1 JC 
20 The first preamble to the Petition of Rights 1627 is 
recorded in the Statutes of the Realm, but was excluded from 
the 1881 reprint and hence Law Commission Report no 1 and RS 
30 (Reprinted Statutes) reprinted at 1 November 1994. 
The further preambles read (Underlining added) 12 
AND WHEREAS .... in order to such an establishment 
as that their religion, laws, and liberties might 
not again be in danger of being subverted ..... . 
AND THEY DO CLAIM, DEMAND, AND INSIST UPON all 
and singular the premisses, as their undoubted 
rights and liberties 
The word "establishment" shows a clear intent to 
found a new political order guaranteeing ancient rights and 
liberties. 
The conditional tender of the Crown to William and Mary 
Parliament had seized power in the Glorious Revolution 
and months later offered the Crown to William and Mary 
conditional upon the guarantee of ancient liberties. The Bill 
of Rights expressly records 
"The Tender of the Crown" was made conditionally: 
[in the] intire confidence that His said Hignesse 
the Prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance 
so farr advanced by him, and will preserve them 
from the violation of their rights .... and from 
all other attempts upon their religion, rights, 
and liberties ... 
The tender of the Crown conditional upon the guarantee 
of the ancient Magna Carta rights was a traditional pattern 
given added political significance by the writings of John 
Locke (1632-1704) on the Social Contract. John Locke's 
principle work "An Essay concerning Human Understanding" was 
finally published in 1690. 
No takings except by the unequivocal direction of Parliament 
The Petition of Right and Bill of Rights are the direct 
constitutional authority for the insistence of the Courts that 
the fundamental rights of the citizen are only to be taken at 
the unequivocal direction of Parliament with a strong 
presumption of compensation. Magna Carta from 1215 had 
confirmed that the Crown could only take from the citizen on 
payment of compensation or by law of the land. The Bill of 
Rights confirmed in addition that only Parliament could 
authorise taxation. The insistence in all the cases (some 
later examined) that property can only be taken by the 
unequivocal direction of Parliament are based upon the 
taxation provisions in the Petition of Right 1627 and the Bill 
of Rights 1689. 
The Petition of Right 1627 
Reciting that by (25) 34 Edw.1 st.4 c.1, by 
authority of Parliament holden 25 Edw.3, and by 
other laws of this realm, the King's subjects 
should not be taxed but by consent in Parliament. 
The Bill of Rights 1689 
Levying money-That levying money for or to the 
use of the Crowne by pretence of pereogative without 
grant of Parlyament for longer time or in other 13 
manner than the same is or shall be granted is illegal 
B The omission of Section III of the Bill of Rights. 
Compensation must always be paid for reserved fundamental 
rights since parliamentary sovereignty is subject to them. 
The Bill of Rights 1689 (as recorded in Statutes of the 
Realm) comprises three sections of equal importance : 
Section I declares the Rights and Liberties of the Subject. 
Section II outlaws the Crown prerogative to suspend the 
application of statutes by "Dispensation by Non obstante" 
Section III preserves all previous charters, grants or 
Pardons, (including the issues of Magna Carta) 
Technically Magna Carta 1215 is a Charter and Grant and is 
more fundamental than a statute. 
Section III states : 
Provided that noe Charter or Grant or Pardon 
granted before [23 October 1689] shall be any 
wayes impeached or invalidated by this Act but 
that the same shall be and remaine of the same 
force and effect in Law and noe other then as 
if this Act had never beene made. 
The importance of the Third Section in preserving Magna 
Carta can be assessed from the Debates in the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. 29 
Sir Robert Howard, a member of both Treby's and Somer's 
Rights Committees of the House of Commons considering the form 
of the Bill of Rights stated: 
"Rights of the people had been confirmed by 
early Kings both before and after the Norman 
line began. Accordingly, the people have 
always had the same title to their liberties 
and properties that England's Kings have unto 
their Crowns. The several Charters of the 
people's rights, most particularily Magna Carta, 
were not grants from the King, but recognitions 
by the King of rights that had been reserved or 
that appertained unto us by common law and 
immemorial custom". 
However disregarding this proud history and the special 
status of Magna Carta as a Charter the Law Commission in its 
first report "Imperial Legislation in Force in New Zealand" 
stated "Section III, a savings provision, is omitted as 
spent". On the basis of this misinformation, the NZ 
Parliament in the 1988 reaffirmation of the Magna Carta 
legislation, excluded Section III. The Rights and Liberties 
of the Subject can never be "omitted as spent." 
29 Journals of the Houses of Lords and Cotmnons 10:126 
Cobbett debates 
Section 29 of the Evidence Act 1908, amended in 14 
1998 states however : 
(1) Every copy .. . of any Imperial enactment 
... being a copy purported to be printed .. ... 
under the authority of the New Zealand 
Government shall ... be deemed -
(a) To be a correct copy of that Act of Parliament 
(2) Every copy of any Imperial enactment .... 
being a copy purporting to be printed ... by the 
Queen's .. . printer ... shall ... be deemed-
(a) To be a correct copy of that enactment 
Statutes of the Realm containing the missing preambles and 
Section 111 are acknowledged by the New Zealand Parliament as 
authentic. The omitted Section III remains part of the statute 
law of New Zealand along with the other Imperial legislation. 
At the least Section III gives rise to the strongest 
presumptions of interpretation in favour of compensation . It 
can however be strongly argued that since Parliament ' s 
authority originates from the Bill of Rights 1689, Parliament 
would be acting unconstitutionally and ultra vires if passing 
Acts confiscating private property without properly providing 
for compensation. It would equally be beyond Parliament's 
powers to repeal Section III without very wide constitutional 
consultation and in practical poltical terms a referendum. 
IV THE COMMON LAW METHOD : THE REFINEMENT OF MAGNA CARTA 
PRINCIPLES THROUGH THE JUDICIAL POWER OF INTERPRETATION 
A The Maintenance of Existing Rights and the Right to 
Compensation in the Common Law 
Section 5 of the Imperial Laws Application Act 198830 
states that the common law of England (including the 
principles and rules of equity) shall continue to be part of 
the laws of New Zealand. It is expressly preserved by Section 
28 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights : 
28 Other rights and freedoms not affected 
An existing right or freedom shall not be held 
to be abrogated or restricted by reason only 
that the right or freedom is not included in 
this Bill of Rights or is included only in part . 
The term "common law" defies ready definition, since 
Judges for generations have preferred that the principles of 
the Common Law generally derived from the Magna Carta 
legislation remain elastic, so that the black letter of 
statute can be more efficiently interpreted to accord with the 
changing needs of society and morality. Significantly the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the common law as "law 
derived from custom and judicial precedent rather than 
statutes". This is not a definition of the term, but only an 
explanation of its origin . 
30 Given in full above at IIC and discussed n18 
Judicial freedom to interprete the law is usefully 15 
described as a convention by Justice Baragwanath in Cooper 
v Attorney General 31 (later discussed). That freedom as a 
matter of constitutional convention is partly codified in the 
Evidence Act 1908 and the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 . 
Section 28 of the Evidence Act 
28 Judicial notice of Acts of Parliament Judicial 
notice shall be taken by all Courts and persons 
acting judicially of all Acts of Parliament. 32 
An example of the Conventions from the Interpretation 
Act 1999 
Section 17 Effect of repeal generally - (1) The repeal 
of an enactment does not affect -
(b) An existing right, interest ... title .... 
Sections 20 and 20A of the previous Acts Interpretation 
Act were in similiar terms . The wording is similiar to 
Section III of the Bill of Rights Act 1689 . The word "right" 
in Section 1 7 echoes Magna Carta. 33 
31 Cooper v Attorney General [1996] NZLR 480 VF 30 
32 The convenient belief common among Planners that the 
Resource Management Act is a "pure statutory regime" is 
untenable in view of Section 28 of the Evidence Act . The 
writer encountered this in questions from the bench in WRC v 
DTS Riddiford ENF 172/95, involving the jurisdictional extent 
of the coastal marine area. Later the tapes of evidence were 
first stated to be "destroyed" and then following an Ombudsman 
enquiry merely "mislaid . " The Minister of Courts was however · 
unable to help in their production. Magna Carta had been 
argued. 
Recent cases from the Environment Court indicate a 
rethinking of property rights : 
1 The concept of "reverse sensitivity" 
eg Wairoa Coolstores v Western Bay of Plenty DC A016/1998 
Millark Properties v Perpetual Trust A30/98 
2 Decisions on S85 of the RMA 
Steven v Christchurch City Council C38/98 
Deegan v Southland District Council Cll0/98 
33 Colonial Sugar Refining v Melbourne Harbour Trust 
Commissioners [1927] AC 343 The Privy Council applied the 
equivalent provision to S17 Interpretation Act 1999 for the 
State of Victoria and the principle that a statute should not 
be held to take away rights of property without compensation 
and ruled that the clear words of Statute could not remove 
property rights obtained by limitation. 
Followed by the House of Lords in Hartnell v Minister of 
Housing [1964] AC 1134 holding that uncompensated controls on 
a caravan site should be cut back due to existing use rights. 
The Law Commission paper on the Acts 16 
Interpretation Act 192434 comments that "The provisions, 
contained in Sections 20 and 20A, conform with the common law 
presumption that new statutes do not have retroactive 
operation". Magna Carta is the origin of that presumption. 
B The "Ancient Constitution" and the Phil.osophy of the 
Common Law Guided Judicial. Freedom of Interpretation toward 
Fundamental. Moral Precept and the Duty to Compensate 
Magna Carta and its reaffirmations since 1215 reflect 
community opinion on fundamental moral and political 
principle. Those basic principles have been refined by Judges 
to become established common law precedent. Refined precedent 
has often reemerged in statutory codifications or reform 
measures. 35 The process continues today with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. 36 
J.G.A. Pocock in The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law 1 a historiographic study examined the fierce 
controversy in the 1600's between the common lawyers asserting 
that the constitution was "immemorial " 38 and the few 
professional historians addressing history critically. 
The common lawyers defended the "Ancient Constitution", 
34 Law Commission Paper NZLC PPl "Legislation and its 
Interpretation The Acts Interpretation Act 1924 and Related 
Legislation" 23 lines 34-35 and generally 15-31 
35 Ch 20 of Magna Carta 1215 is an example 
"A free man shall not be ammerced for a trivial offence, 
except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a 
serious offence he shall be ammerced according to its gravity, 
saving his livelihood .. " "Ammerced" is fined or charged costs. 
36 David A Strauss in Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation Univ of Chicago Law Review Vol 63 No 3 Summer 
1996 877-935 describes the same common law process of 
interpretation for the American Constitution. He first 
explains at 879 that American constitutional debate divides 
between "textualism" (literalism) and "originalism" (the 
founders'intentions). He then states that "common law 
constitutional interpretation" has two components 
"traditionalist'' (follow precedent always) and 
"conventionalist" (follow precedent to avoid unproductive 
controversy). He concludes that the common law approach based 
on precedent and convention is the reason that the 
constitutions of England and the United States are similiar. 
37 J .G.A. Pocock "The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal 
Law" led Camb Univ Press 1957 and reissue 1987 with retrospect 
38 "Time immemorial" meant to before 1189 the beginning 
of the reign of Richard I. This is reflected in the law of 
prescription (adverse occupation) part of the law of New 
Zealand under the Prescription Act 1832. 
despite it being a legal fiction, as a means of allowing the 
hard letter of Parliamentary statute and the law to be 17 
ameliorated by reference to ancient moral precept. 
The Roots of Liberty3 9 describes the profound 
influence of Chief Justice Sir John Fortescue (c 1385-1479) on 
the Common Law. Fortescue acknowledged that the law of nature 
was universal, as taught by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and 
argued that the laws and customs of England were very ancient. 
He explained that all human law is "law of nature, customs, or 
statutes,which are also called constitutions [constituciones]" 
Chief Justice Coke was influenced by Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas through Sir John Fortescue. Coke acknowledged that 
Fortescue's De Laudibus Legum Angliae was of such "weight and 
worthiness" that it should be "written in letters of gold'' . 
John Locke (1632-1704) filled the philosophical void 
left after the idea of the Ancient Constitution fell into 
disrepute. All his major works were first published in England 
in 1689 after the arrival of William of Orange. His concept 
of the Social Contract clearly influenced the formal tender of 
the Crown to William and Mary conditional upon the guarantee 
of all the liberties of the Ancient Constitution. After that 
the legal fiction of the Ancient Constitution was unnecessary. 
Lord Cooke in promoting the concept of Fundamentals
40 
"some statement of accepted ideals rather more contemporary 
and comprehensive than Magna Carta or the 1689 Bill of 
Rights ... for a unifying expression of values accepted by the 
whole community" is working in the time honoured method of the 
Common Law and the Ancient Constitution. 
Economics now influences Judicial decisions. 4
1 
Inevitably John Locke will have a further influence through 
public choice theory (the application of economic ideas to 
legislative and judicial decisions). John Locke is a major 
influence on Professor Richard Epstein of Chicago University, 
a leading advocate of public choice theory and the important 
role of the 4th Amendment takings clause in the American 
Constitution. 42 
39 The Roots of Liberty Magna Carta, Ancient 
Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of the Rule of 
Law n 12 above esp Introduction by Sandoz at 10 . 
4 ° Fundamentals Sir Robin Cooke NZLJ May 1998 158 at 159 
1 col line 45. See also 
The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown now Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon 28-40 in Essays on the Constitution edit PA Joseph 
Brookers 1995 
41 Cooper 484 lines 8-9 refers to the American Business 
Law Journal discussing the economic and philosophical debate 
over Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council. 
42 RA Epstein Takings Private Property and the Power 
of Eminent Domain Harvard Univ Press 1985 
Simple Rules for a Complex World Harvard Univ Press 1995 
lV THE ENGLISH RULES CASELAW 18 
The English Rules are the substantial body of Judge 
made caselaw from the House of Lords and Privy Council 
governing the law of takings and compensation, whenever 
statutory provision is imprecise or inadequate. Since there 
are strong constitutional presumptions of interpretation in 
favour of the citizen the influence of Judges has remained 
stronger and the body of caselaw more universal than in other 
areas of the law . The often unspoken influence of Magna Carta 
and the general political utility of property rights as argued 
by John Locke are clear factors in the more significant 
decisions. 43 
This section examines the leading decisions (obliquely 
mentioning Magna Carta) affirming the constitutional 
presumption that full compensation must always be paid in the 
absence of an unequivocal direction from Parliament. The 
concomitant obligation on the Crown is expressed in a 1993 
Crown Law opinion 
A 
There are many types of rights taken away by 
the State that give rise to compensation and 
unless there are good policy reasons for not 
paying compensation it should be provided for. 44 
Central Control Board v Cannon Brewery 
The dictum of Lord Atkinson in Central Control Board 
(Liquor Traffic) v Cannon Brewery Limited (1919) HL 
4 5 is 
often repeated. The Board had taken under statutory powers the 
fee simple of licensed premises. The underlinings throughout 
this paper are added : 
..... the principle recognised as a canon of 
construction by many authorities . .. is ... 
that an intention to take away the property 
of a subject without giving to him a legal 
right to compensation for the loss of it is 
not to be imputed to the Legislature unless 
that intention is expressed in uneguivocal terms. 
43 Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 IVD below 
Viscount Radcliffe 117 C to 118 D quotes John Locke. 
44 Crown Law Opinion on Fishing Permits MAF 042/143 
45 Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v Cannon 
Brewery [1919] AC 744 Recent examples of the Courts' 
insistence on "unequivocal intention to take property" can be 
seen in Mabo v State of Queensland (2) [1992] 107 ALR 192 HCA 
Brennan J ln 42 Toohey J 152 ln 35-153 ln4 (refers to Cannon), 
Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General 2 
NZLR 20 CA 25 lns 9-25 Yanner v Eaton www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
/cases/cth/highct/1999/53 paras 34,35 106-118 
Justice Barker stated as obiter in Falkner v Gisborne District 
[1995] NZLR 622 at 633 line 12 that the Resource Management 
Act in terms of Cannon Brewery "contains no such unequivocal 
intention" to remove the right to compensation. 
B 
I used the words "legal right to compensation" 19 
advisedly, as I think these authorities establish 
that, in the absence of unequivocal language 
confining the compensation payable to a sum ex 
gratia, it cannot be so confined. 
The dictum of Lord Atkinson was supported by Lord 
Parmoor 46 : 
It is not necessary in a case of this character 
to base the decision on any presumption in 
favour of construing an Act of Parliament so 
as to give compensation where property is 
compulsorily acquired for public purposes, 
but the presumption is too well established to 
be open to doubt or question. The prerogative 
of the Crown was referred to in argument, but 
it is contrary to a principle enshrined in our 
law at least since the date of Magna Carta, to 
suggest that an executive body, such as the 
Central Control Board, can claim, under the 
prerogative, to confiscate, for the benefit 
of the Crown, the private property of subjects 
Lord Wrenbury 47 • 
The power to take compulsorily raises by 
implication a right to payment, and that 
right is neither conferred by, nor governed 
by, nor in any way affected by the Proclamation 
and later 4 8 : 
The true effect of the legislation is that 
existing rights of compensation are left 
untouched and that new provision is made for 
compensation ex gratia. 
Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 
A year later the House of Lords in Attorney General v 
De Keyser's Royal Hotel ll considered a similiar wartime 
taking of a hotel under the Defence of the Realm Regulations . 
The Crown had argued in part that it was entitled to take the 
Hotel under the War Prerogative. 
Lord Dunedin records that the "Master of the Rolls in 
his judgment" had searched the court records as to whether 
past practice had been to pay compensation and notes : 
46 
47 
48 
49 
[1920] 
He has divided the time occupied by the 
search into three periods-the first prior 
to 1788. then from 1788 to 1798. and the 
Cannon Brewery Lord Parmoor 760 lines 23-33 
Cannon Brewery Lord Wrenbury 763 lines 24-26 
Cannon Brewery Lord Wrenbury 764 line 11 
Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Limited 
AC 508 
third subseguent to 1798. The first period 20 
contained instances of the acquiral of 
private property for the purposes of defence 
by private negotiation, in all of which, it 
being a matter of negotiation, there is 
reference to the payment to be offered for 
the land taken. With the second period we 
begin the series of statutes which authorise 
the taking of lands, and make provision for 
the assessment of compensation, the statutes 
being of a local and not a general character, 
dealing with the particular lands proposed to 
be taken. The third period begins with the 
introduction of general statutes not directed 
to the acquisition of particular lands, and 
again making provision for the assessment and 
payment of compensation . 50 
There is a universal practice of payment 
resting on bargain before 1708. and on 
statutory power and provision after 1708. 
51 
Similiarly Lord Atkinson stated 
I desire to express my complete concurrence 
in the conclusion at which the late Master 
of the Rolls arrived as to the nature of 
the searchs made by the Crown ....... it 
does not appear that the Crown has ever 
taken for these purposes the land of the 
subject without paying for it, and there 
is no trace of the Crown having, even in 
the times of the Stuarts, exercised or 
asserted the power or right to do so by 
virtue of the Royal Prerogative. 52 
None of the Judgements mentioned Cannon Brewery but 
all emphasised "the well established principle that, unless no · 
other interpretation is possible, justice requires that 
statutes should not be construed to enable the land of a 
particular individual to be confiscated without payment" . 
(Lord Parmoor) . 53 
Similiarly Lord Atkinson: 
The recognised rule for the construction 
of statutes is that, unless the words of 
50 
51 
De Keyser Lord Dunedin 524 lines 20-34 
De Keyser Lord Dunedin 525 lines 1-3 
52 De Keyser Lord Atkinson 538 lines 31-33 
Similiarly 
Lord Moulton 552 line 30 to 553 line 2 
Lord Sumner 562 line 33 and all 563 
Lord Parmoor 573 line 25-29 
53 De Keyser Lord Parmoor 576 line 15-19 
the statute clearly so demand, a statute 21 
is not to be construed so as to take away 
the property of a citizen without 
compensation. Bowen LJ in London and North 
Western Ry. Co v Evans [1893] 1 Ch 16,28 said 
"The Legislature cannot fairly be supposed to 
intend, in the absence of clear words shewing 
such intention, that one man's property shall 
be confiscated for the benefit of others, or 
of the public, without any compensation being 
provided for him in respect of what is 
compulsorily taken from him. Parliament in its 
omnipotence can, of course override this ordinary 
principle .... but, it is not likely that it will 
be found disregarding it, without plain 
expressions of such a purpose. "54 
The House of Lords in Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart 
v Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] 55 extended to 
enemy aliens the duty to compensate for all takings under the 
war prerogative and expressed its understanding of De Keyser: 
D 
Fr em that decision it appears clear that 
there was never a prerogative to confiscate 
the property of a subject in time of war ..... . . 
Further, if the royal prerogative in the 
days of it's full vigour did not extend to 
confiscation of a subject's property in 
time of war, I am not prepared to assume 
that the legislature intended to confer a 
statutory power to confiscate a subject's 
property in 1939. Such a power would have 
to be very clearly shown by the language 
of the statute and never to be presumed . 
Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate 56 
The Crown duty to compensate when taking under 
54 De Keyser 
Similiarly 
Lord Atkinson 542 lines 19-32 
529 line 35 Lord Dunedin 
Lord Sumner 559 line 22-29 
55 Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart v Administrators of 
Hungarian Property [1954] 584 at 637,638 (638 line 11,12 and 
21-26) 
56 Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 HL ECS Wade 
and AW Bradley Constitutional Law 10 ed 1985 remarks that 
Burmah Oil "established that where private property was taken 
under the prerogative, the owner was entitled at common law to 
compensation from the Crown; but the [UK] War Damage Act 1965 
retrospectively provided that no person shall be entitled at 
common law to receive compensation in respect of damage to or 
destruction of property caused by lawful acts of the Crown 
during war". Burmah Oil remains good authority that at 
common law the Crown is obliged to fully compensate for all 
takings. 
the war prerogative was again considered by the House of 22 
Lords in 1964 in Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate. This was an 
extreme case. Oil wells, buildings, plant and machinery in 
Burma were destroyed in 1942 to deny them to the invading 
Japanese. Assets in Rangoon were destroyed the day before the 
Japanese arrived . All five Judges approved De Keyser and 
agreed that the Crown was under a general duty to compensate. 
All of the Judges agreed that there was an exception for 
battlefield damage57 and two of the Judges, Lords Radcliffe 
and Hodson considered that in the circumstances the 
battlefield exception precluded compensation for the 
destruction of Burmah Oil's assets in the face of an advancing 
enemy . 
Despite the exigencies of war the cases reveal a clear 
obligation to compensate in the absence of statutory provision 
and a willingness to interprete statute to ensure compensation 
59 
The prerogative 
Dicta in Burmah Oil on the nature of the prerogative 
assist in understanding Crown takings (of land, property or 
other rights), when there is no "statutory provision" . They 
evidence the strong constitutional obligation to pay 
compensation . Lord Reid defined the prerogative as "really a 
relic of a past age, not lost by disuse, but only available 
for a case not covered by statute." 60 
Lord Radcliffe repeated an extract from John Locke's 
"True End of Civil Government 11 61 and commented that 
The essence of a prerogative power, if one 
follows out Locke's thought, is not merely to 
administer existing law-but to act for the 
public good, where there is no law, or even to 
dispense with or override the law where the 
ultimate preservation of society is in question. 62 
Lord Pearce made the point that the King was always 
subject to the rule of law and so unable to take anything 
except by their ordinary consent or common consent in 
Parliament and even then subject to the duty to compensate: 
57 
Vattel 
Bracton's theory that the Crown was subject 
to the rule of law has, after some vicissitudes 
Burmah Oil exception for battlefield damage following 
Lord Ratcliffe 130 
Lord Hodson 142 A 
Lord Pearce 162 F 
59 De Keyser and Burmah Oil were followed in Nissan v 
Attorney General [1968) 286 1 QB 286 Eng CA 
60 
61 
62 
Burmah Oil per Lord Reid lOlC at lines 17-19 
Burmah Oil Lord Radcliffe 117D-118B 
Burmah Oil Viscount Radcliffe 118 B,C lines 11-16 
in Stuart times, prevailed . . .. And even in Stuart 
times, Crooke Jin his dissenting judgment in 23 
Hampden's case in 1637, after referring to Magna 
Charta said: "Fortescue Chief justice63 setteth 
down what the law of England is in that kind . . . . 
He cannot take anything from them, without their 
ordinary consent; their common consent it is in 
Parliament .... Show me any book of law against this, 
that the king shall take no man's goods, but he 
shall pay for it,though it be for his own provision; 64 
An interesting question arises as to whether a 
Plaintiff should draft his pleadings on the basis of seeking 
full compensation in terms of the common law and the Crown 
Prerogative as a way of avoiding the increasingly restrictive 
payouts available under modern clauses of statutory provision 
for compensation. Would Judges in terms of the canon of 
liberal construction prescribed in Cannon Brewery and the 
other authorities be inclined to then read down the modern 
statutory provision to permit common law compensation or find 
that the plaintiff had more than one avenue for compensatory 
redress? 65 In that case their action would be founded 
directly on Magna Carta. 66 
Recent New Zealand decisions (not on property 
takings) argued on Magna Carta such as Shaw v Commissioner of 
63 Sir John Fortescue (c1385-1479) discussed above at 
IIIC3 17 
64 Burmah Oil Lord Pearce 147 line 37 to 148 line 18 
65 See further discussion on the prerogative in Wade and 
Bradley n 56 extracted in Chen and Palmer at 260 and on the 
Royal Prerogative Halsbury's Laws of England Vol 8 (2) paras 
367 - 381 
66 Consider Canada Sisters of Charity of Rockingham v The 
King [1922] AC JC 315 at 322 lines 7-8 "Compensation claims 
are statutory and depend on statutory provisions". The words 
are dicta. Presumably statutory provision in Sisters of 
Charity was sufficiently comprehensive to have abridged the 
common law right to compensation. 
Consider Australia Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The 
Commonwealth of Australia 147 ALR 42 (HCA) discussed by K Ryan 
"Compensation for Removal of Property Rights in Australia" 
(December 1997) 5 Resource Management News 17. In Newcrest 
Kirby J 149 line 1-5 discounted the clear words of the 
Australian Constitution and stated that "Historically, its 
roots may be traced as far as Magna Carta 1215, Art 52 . . . " 
Consider USA RA Epstein Takings (n41) 42 line 27 
"The rights of action ... should be considered not as a matter 
of legislative grace, but as constitutionally mandated under 
the takings clause. The conclusion may appear radical, but it 
is supported not only in principle but also by a diverse range 
of authority .. . Armstrong v United States 364 US 40 (1960) ". 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Inland Revenue .u and The Queen v Richard John Cresser ll 24 
have shown the Courts reluctant to have Magna Carta argued on 
a regular basis, but careful to ensure that it is respected 
and not forgotten. 
E Belfast Corporation v O.D. Cars HL: Regulatory Takings 
The Respondents owned land on which for many years 
they had operated a service garage. Their application to 
erect shops on the street frontage and factories in the rear 
was declined by Belfast Corporation on the basis that it did 
not comply with the zoning of the site as shops limited to a 
height of 25ft in the front and residential use in the rear . 
69 
They claimed compensation under the Government of 
Ireland Act 1920 which stated that the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland could not make laws which would "take property without 
compensation". The House of Lords decided against the 
Respondents on the narrow ground of statutory interpretation 
that planning rights to build could not be described as 
"property" in terms of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
The importance of the case lies in the dicta 
(unnecessary to the issue in hand) supporting the Cannon 
Brewery 10 line of authority and emphasising that in an 
appropriate case a regulatory taking would be treated as a 
confiscatory taking obliging the authority to compensate. A 
regulatory taking of property destroys or limits the use 
rights as distinct from the occupancy rights . 
Lord Radcliffe: 71 
A survey would, I think, discern two divergent 
lines of approach . On the one hand, there would 
be the general principle, accepted by the 
legislature and scrupulously defended by the 
courts, that the title to property or the 
enjoyment of its possession was not to be 
compulsorily acquired from a subject unless 
full compensation was afforded in it's place . 
Acquisition of title or possession was "taking". 
Aspects of this principle are found in the rules 
of statutory interpretation devised by the courts 
which required the presence of the most explicit 
words before an acquisition could be held to be 
61 Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue CA 218/97 
Richardson P Henry J Blanchard J 
68 The Queen v Richard John Cresser CA 39 / 98 per 
Blanchard J 
69 Belfast Corporation v O.D. Cars [1960) AC 490 HL(NI) 
10 Belfast Corporation v OD Cars Viscount Simonds 517 
line 39 to 518 line 3 
71 Lord Radcliffe 523 lines 7 to 33 
sanctioned by an Act of Parliament without full 25 
compensation being provided, or importing an 
intention to give compensation and machinery for 
assessing it into any Act of Parliament that did 
not purposively exclude it . This vigilance to 
see that the subject's rights to property were 
protected, so far as was consistent with the 
requirements of expropriation of what was 
previously enjoyed in specie, was regarded as 
an important guarantee of individual liberty. 
It would be a mistake to look on it as 
representing any conflict between the 
legislature and the courts. The principle 
was . .. common to both. 
The words last underlined reflect the belief that 
the requirement for compensation is a constitutional 
convention binding on both the Courts and the Legislature. The 
words "machinery for assessing it" suggests that the role of 
the Court is to make up for Parliament's omission in not 
providing statutory compensation . The concept of convention is 
a major feature of Cooper v Attorney General(discussed at VE). 
Lord Radcliffe continues : 
Side by side with this, however ... came the great 
movement for the regulation of life in cities 
and towns in the interests of public health and 
amenity . .... . "police powers". 12 
. .. interference with rights of development and 
user ... was not [generally] treated as a "taking" 
of property . 73 
Lord Radcliffe hints at a possible distinction between 
"police" functions and amenity values 
When town planning came in eo nomine in 1909 
the emphasis had shifted from considerations 
of public health to the wider and more 
debatable ground of public amenity . 74 
I do not imply by what I have said that I regard 
it as out of the question that on a particular 
12 Lord Radcliffe 523 26-33. Mr Paul Cassin in 
"Compensation: An Examination of the Law" Working Paper 14 
prepared for the Ministry for the Environment November 1988 
cites this later passage at 21, but surprisingly does not put 
it in context, by reporting the earlier passage. The report 
extending to 106 pages is defective in that it confines itself 
to statutory provisions and does not discuss the common law 
presumption of compensation or the economic and utilitarian 
arguments for compensation. The report leaves the misleading 
impression that in terms of OD Cars there would never at 
Common Law be compensation for a regulatory taking. 
73 
74 
Lord Radcliffe 524 line 36 
Lord Radcliffe 524 lines 26 - 33 
occasion there might not be a restriction of 26 
user so extreme that in substance, though not 
in form, it amounted to a "taking" of the land 
affected for the benefit of the public. 15 
Viscount Simmonds 
Lord Radcliffe's last remark as to regulatory taking 
so extreme as to warrant compensation is echoed in the 
judgment of Viscount Simmonds . 
. . . . the distinction that may exist between 
measures that are confiscatory, and that a 
measure which is ex facie regulatory may in 
substance be confiscatory .... 76 
Earlier he had quoted and approved the dictum of 
Holmes J of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co v Mahon 11 that "The general rule ... is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognised as a taking." 
Compensation for regulatory takings 
Regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution have generated a huge and expanding 
jurisprudence in the United States . 
No person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 78 
The Commonwealth approach has been more restrained . 
Compensation for regulatory taking has been awarded throughout 
the Commonwealth. 
75 
76 
Lord Radcliffe 525 lines 27 - 31 
Lord Radcliffe 520 lines 2-5 
11 Pensylvania Coal Co v Mahon (1922) 260 US 393, 417 
quoted by Viscount Simmonds at 51 lines 19-22 
78 See discussion in Should the RMA Include a Takings 
Regime? Kathleen Ryan NZJEL Vol 2 1998 63 69-73 
Lucas v So Carolina Coastal Council(l992) 505 US 1003, 
112 S Ct 2886 and discussion in the American Business Law 
Journal 1995 Vol 33 153 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal 
Council, discussing the influence of Richard Epstein's 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(1985) Harvard Univ Press. Cooper nlOO 484 referred to Lucas 
and the American Business Law article. 
See generally Laurence H Tribe Chapter 9 587-628 American 
Constitutional Law 2 ed 1988 Foundation Press 
George Skouras Takings Law and the Supreme Court 1998 Amazon 
Robert Meltz The Takings Issue 1999 Amazon. 
In Manitoba Fisheries v The Queen 79 the Supreme 27 
Court of Canada ordered compensation to a fish company which 
had been forced to close by the creation of a statutory 
monopoly fish export business. The Court considered that the 
goodwill of the business was property, which could be 
compensated. 
Turners & Growers Exports v CJ Moyle00 was factually 
similiar. The 4 exporters were to lose their licences to 
export kiwifruit on formation of the New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board in 1989. The 1953 Primary Products Marketing 
Act barred claims. The new regulations made no provision for 
compensation. M'Geghan J introduced "machinery" for 
compensation by finding that "as a matter of procedural 
fairness before the Minister recommended Regulations to the 
Governor-General in Council opportunity should have been given 
to the exporters to make representations as to 
compensation. 11 01 
M'Geghan J (conscious that his decision would 
conflict with the clear will of Parliament) stated that 
"relief in review proceedings is discretionary" giving him a 
choice between (i) making orders (ii) refusal of relief or 
(iii) adjournment pending legislative solution as in 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon. He decided that "the Minister should 
[now] receive representations from the applicants on 
compensation matters, giving such representations a fair 
hearing". 02 After the judgment Sir Wallace Rowling was 
appointed by the Labour Government to negotiate compensation, 
which was duly paid. s3 
In Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth of 
Australia04 regulatory taking of Newcrest's mining leases 
occurred through the combined effect of the National 
Parks . .. Act 1987 (Commonwealth) outlawing the recovery of 
minerals in Kakadu National Park and expressly providing that 
no compensation was to be paid and proclamations extending the 
Park's area to include the mining leases. A majority of the 
High Court of Australia found that under the Australian 
constitution there was an obligation to compensate for takings 
despite the clear letter of statute (the National .. . Parks 
79 Manitoba Fisheries Limited v The Queen [1979) 1 SCR 
101 
00 Turners & Growers Exports Limited v CJ Moyle CP 720/88 
M'Geghan J 
01 Turners & Growers Exports Limited v CJ Moyle CP 720/88 
at 67 lines 14 - 18 
82 
83 
Turners & Growers Exports Limited 72 lines 25-27 
MAF 042/ 143 para 24 6 lines 27 - 30 
84 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth of 
Australia (1997) 147 ALR 42 (HCA) 42 
Act). The minority felt they were bound by the precedent 28 
of Teori Tau v Commonwealth .u a previous decision of the High 
Court denying "just compensation" under the constitution for 
Federal Government taking of minerals in Papua New Guinea. 
The judgment of Kirby J is notable for it's reference 
to Magna Carta 1215 °6 and the statement that "Where the 
Constitution is ambiguous, this court should adopt that 
meaning which conforms to the principles of fundamental rights 
rather than an interpretation which would involve a departure 
from such rights". 87 He then refers to Australia's 
obligations to compensate under Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration and traverses international law. 00 
The Queen v Tener [1985] SC Can° 9 is factually 
similiar to Newcrest. The Crown refused to renew a park use 
permit preventing the Appellant from exploring or using their 
mineral claims. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that 
compensation under the Park Act should be paid for the 
regulatory taking. It expressly followed De Keyser. 90 
La Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre Ltee v Government 
of Mauritius 91 involved Government amendment to the longterm 
sharecropping contracts for sugarcane on the Island of 
Mauritius. The same issues arose as with the statutory 
lessees under the New Zealand Maori Reserved Land Act, except 
that it was the Landords who objected . 
The Privy Council found against the Landlords on the 
facts and approved the dictum of Holmes Jin Pennsylvania Coal 
Co v Mahon ll that "if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognised as a taking" 93 and stated following Sporrong v 
Sweden 94 a European Court case that : 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
508 
on an issue of this nature . . . [it] ... will 
extend to the national court a substantial 
Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969 ) 119 CLR 564 
Newcrest Kirby J 149 lines 1 - 2 
Newcrest 147 lines 21-25 
Newcrest 148 lines 25-27 and generally 147 line 21-32 
The Queen v Tener [1985] 1 SCR 533 17DLR (4th) 1 
Attorney-General v De Keyser 1 s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 
91 La Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre Ltee and Others v 
Government of Mauritius [1995] 3 LRC 494 per Lord Woolf 
92 
93 
94 
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon (1922) US 393 at 415-416 
Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre 502 h-i 
Sporrong v Sweden [1982] EHRR 35 at 50 
margin of appreciation. Similiarly ... [it 29 
would respect] the national legislature's 
judgement as to what is in the public interest 
when implementing social and economic policies 
unless that judgement is manifestly without 
foundation ... 95 
and added that there may be 
substantial deprivation of property ... if because 
of the lack of any provision for compensation, 
they do not achieve a fair balance between the 
interests of the community and the rights of 
individuals .. 96 
and approved the statement of the Mauritius Supreme 
Court that 
... although there may not be deprivation as 
such, nevertheless the restrictions and controls 
are such as to be disproportionate to the aims 
which may be legitimately achieved ... as to leave 
the property a valueless shell .... a "constructive 
deprivation" 97 
Despite the provisions of Section 85(1) of the Resource 
Management Act that "(l) An interest in land shall be deemed 
not to be taken or injuriously affected by reason of any 
provision in a plan unless otherwise provided for in this 
Act, " Justice Barker in Falkner v Gisborne District Council 98 
stated 
It was ... submitted for the residents that 
an intention to take away property without 
giving a legal right to compensation is not 
to be imputed to the legislature unless that 
intention is expressed in clear and unambiguous 
terms .. .. Cannon Brewery .... . The Act contains no 
such uneguivocal intention (Underlining added) 
Compensation may be available under the Resource 
Management Act. It is significant that neither Magna Carta or 
Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's case] (later discussed 
VIE 39) were argued in Falkner. Despite the decision in 
Falkner, none of the offending sea protection works have been 
removed by the Council since the case. In June 1999 the 
Gisborne Council at it's own expense did some maintenance on 
the works at the south end of the beach. 99 That suggests 
that the Gisborne Council recognises that compensation may in 
fact be payable. 
95 Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre 503 d-e 
96 Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre 504 i-505 a 
97 Compagnie Sucriere de Bel Ombre 505i-506a 
98 Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995] NZRMA 462,478 lines 22-26 
99 Anecdotal from one of the residents funding the case. 
F Cooper v Attorney General [1996] 100 30 
In Cooper Justice Baragwanath faced an extreme claim 
by representative fishermen asking the court to overrule an 
unequivocal direction from Parliament that they should 
receive no extra quota. Parliament had reversed the benefit 
for them of an earlier Court of Appeal decision in Jenssen v 
Director-General of Fisheries 1 0 1 by passing Section 28ZGA of 
the Fisheries Act imposing a condition precedent that the 
fishers must already be a holder of the relevant fishing 
permit. The decision records extracts from Hansard that the 
fisheries could not be sustained if quota were issued for the 
additional "30,000 tonnes of quota . . ...... with a current 
market value of $85 million" . 10 :2 The fishermen had argued on 
the authority of Cooke J by way of dicta in four cases that 
Parliament could not remove their deep common law rights, 
principally of access to the courts (the "Rule in Chester v 
Bateson" ) . 103 
1 The conventions 
Justice Baragwanath addresses the issue immediately: 
The settled rule of law that the Courts will 
give effect to an Act of Parliament according 
to its terms provides the answer to these cases. 
They also illustrate why both Parliament and 
the Courts observe, and must clearly be seen 
to observe, the conventions whose acceptance 
in New Zealand has substantially avoided the 
constitutional friction that is a feature of 
the arrangements of other societies . 104 
Justice Baragwanath's deliberate use of the word 
"conventions" with constitutional overtones is significant . 
It suggests in context that the presumption that full 
compensation should be paid for every taking unless Parliament 
uses unequivocal language is a part of the constitution . The 
approach to constitutional convention adopted by Justice 
Baragwanath in Cooper was approved by the Court of Appeal in 
Shaw v Shaw. 105 The word "convention" is defined in the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary as "general agreement" and 
100 Cooper v Attorney General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 
101 Jenssen v Attorney General CA 313/91 16 September 
1992 Wellington 
102 Cooper 491 line 32 
103 Chester v Bateson (1920) l KB 829 
104 Cooper v Attorney General 483 lines 7 - 9 See also 485 
105 Shaw v Shaw unrep CA 218/97 Richardson P Henry J . 
Blanchard J at paras 14 and 17 
"customary practice" . 1 06 The word implies Magna Carta 31 
and respect for established customs and rights. 101 
It remains to be seen how hard the New Zealand 
Judiciary will fight to defend the Conventions. What other 
relevant principles can be drawn from the case? 
2 The Court's power of interpretation 
The usual New Zealand and English approach to 
constitutional issues is to confine the Court's role to 
interpretation of statute and avoid direct conflict with 
unequivocal direction from Parliament. That approach has been 
continued in Sections 5 and 6 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 directing that interpretation consistent with 
the Bill of Rights is to be preferred . Justice Baragwanath: 
There is no basis under the guise of 
construction to avoid the obvious 
intent of the measure .. .. 
The sole issue, in every realistically 
conceivable case, is not of Parliament's 
jurisdiction but of construction. 11 10 0 
But note however the phrase ''realistically conceivable case" . 
3 Intervention in extreme cases 
After considering the dicta of Cooke Jin Taylor v New 
Zealand Poultry Board ll2. and extra-judicial writings in 
"Fundamentals" Justice Baragwanath stated (the underlining is 
added) 
Cooke J [delivering the majority judgement] 
does not however suggest that property rights 
conferred on a citizen by statute may not be 
taken away by another statute; nor in my view 
is such a proposition arguable. 
Nor, properly construed, does the amendment : 
11 
••• take away the rights of citizens to 
106 Concise Oxford Dictionary 292 9 ed 1995 Clarendon 
Press Oxford. 
101 G Marshall Constitutional Conventions 1984 Oxford 
Univ Press 9 line line 14 11 •• • the most obvious and undisputed 
convention of the British constitutional system is that 
Parliament does not use its unlimited sovereign power of 
legislation in an oppressive or tyranical way." 
Consider Cooke Pin Prebble v TVNZ [1993] 3NZLR 513 at 
517 lines 35-40 11 • •• the conventions applying to the 
relationship between the Courts and Parliament. The 
legislative, executive and judicial arms of the state do not 
intrude into the spheres of one another except when that is 
essential to the proper performance of a constitutional role. 
There is a principle of mutual restraint . " 
108 Cooper 496 lines 10-18 
1 09 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 
resort to the ordinary Courts of law for 32 
determination of their rights" 
in the sense Cooke J had in mind because 
despite the language in which the amendment 
is expressed the dominant purpose is to 
extinguish the rights: not just bar a remedy 
I am accordingly relieved from venturing 
into what happily remains in New Zealand an 
extra-judicial debate, as to whether in any 
circumstances the judiciary could or should 
impose limits on the exercise of Parliament's 
legislative authority to remove more 
fundamental rights. 110 
Again 
Whether in New Zealand a bill of attainder 
would fall into Cooke J proscribed category 
is fortunately unlikely to be tested; it is 
inconceivable that our Parliament would 
infringe the rule of law so as to destroy 
any right that is truly fundamental. 111 
Certain property rights not conferred by statute, such 
as land rights, may not be removable on the statutory whim of 
Parliament or perhaps only on payment of full compensation. 
The first phrase underlined above implies this. Since Justice 
Baragwanath (also President of the Law Commission) is aware of 
the debate over Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1689, it is 
probable that he is aware that the Sovereignty of Parliament 
conceded by the Bill of Rights 1689 is conditional upon the 
fundamental liberties and rights affirmed in the preambles and 
in the omitted third section. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the reference to a 
bill of attainder in the next quotation. 112 Historically a 
bill of attainder was the forfeiture of land and civil rights 
as a result of a sentence of death for treason or felony. 
Arbitrary confiscation of land without full compensation would 
obviously fall into the Cooke J proscribed category. 
Use of the phrase "conferred on a citizen by statute" 
suggests a possible distinction between property rights of 
recent possession and those possessed for a long time. It is 
also consistent with a distinction between fundamental rights 
guaranteed by section III of the Bill of Rights 1689 and 
rights of recent creation. 
110 
111 
Cooper 484 lines 36-50 
Cooper 498 lines 17-19 
112 Cooper 498 lines 17-19 
Attainder is generally discussed at 497 line 1 to 498 line 20 
4 Sustainability of the fishery 33 
Sustainability of the fishery and the impact upon the 
property rights of existing quota holders are an important 
public policy factor. In searching for the intention of the 
Legislature Baragwanath J was influenced by sustainability and 
protection of the rights of existing property (quota) holders) 
He quotes with approval the remark of the Labour party 
Spokesman on Fisheries113 repeated by the Attorney General114 
...... an unrestricted right to challenge past 
decisions almost inevitably will result in an 
allocation of additional quota and permits to 
an extent that will adversely impact on not 
only the fishery itself but also on existing 
quota and permit holders. 
The remarks on sustainability are important since both 
the Fisheries Act 1996 and the Resource Management Act 1991 
declare sustainable management as their purposes . 115 
Sustainability may be argued in the future as a policy ground 
to deny compensation. 
Property rights protected by the Magna Carta guarantees 
of prompt due process 116 and compensation however best ensure 
environmental commitment . A common misconception is that 
Magna Carta property rights are absolute and thus out of touch 
with the needs of modern society . However Magna Carta rights 
are all subject to law and through the law the needs of 
neighbours represented by the State. They are not libertarian. 
A modern view of Common Law Magna Carta rights was eloquently 
expressed in Ex Walsh and Johnson 111 by Isaacs Jin the High 
Court of Australia 
113 
114 
. ... certain fundamental principles which form 
the base of the social structure of every British 
community ... . Magna Carta. Chap 29 .. recognises 
three basic principles, namely, 
(1) ... every free man has an inherent right to 
his life, liberty, property and citizenship 
Cooper Mr G Kelly 492 lines 46-49 
Cooper 495 lines 46-49 
115 Fisheries Act 1998 Section (1) 
"The purpose of this Act is to promote the utilisation of 
fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability" 
Section 5 (1) Resource Management Act 1991 
"The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources" 
116 
250 
280 
420 
First Schedule Imperial 
Edw III AD 1351 
Edw III AD 1354 
Edw III AD 1368 
Laws Application Act 1988 
111 Ex parte Walsh and Johnson In Re Yates [1925] CLR 79 
lines 5-34 HCA per Isaacs J. 
(2) his individual rights must always yield 34 
to the necessities of the general welfare 
at the will of the State 
(3) the law of the land is the only mode by 
which the State can so declare its will ... 
The first corollary ... . an initial presumption 
in favour of liberty 
The second corollary is that the Courts 
themselves see that this obligation is strictly 
... fulfilled before they hold that liberty is 
lawfully restrained. 
5 The Rule in Chester v Bateson 
The rule in Chester v Bateson 110 is a convention that 
Parliament is presumed never to intend in statute that 
citizens should not have their rights determined in Court. It 
can be traced back to Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1689. 
119 It is significant that Baragwanath J treated the right to 
resort to the courts as more fundamental than property rights. 
He emphasised that the true intent of the Statute was 
not to " ... takeaway the rights of citizens to resort to the 
ordinary Courts of law for determination of their rights", but 
to remove quota rights. 120 
Early in his judgement 121 he approved New Zealand 
34 Drivers' Association v Road Carriers 122 where the full 
Court of Appeal had stated : 
..... we wish to underline the importance of 
the rule in Chester v Bateson. Indeed we have 
reservations as to the extent to which in New 
Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take away 
the rights of citizens to resort to the 
ordinary Courts of law for the determination 
of their rights. 
Magna Carta had been argued in Chester v Bateson The 
Rule is worth remembering in view of an increasing government 
preference for arbitration as a means to settle compensation 
disputes. S162A of the Biosecurity Act 1997 is an example. 
Arbitration avoids publicity and precedent unfavorable to the 
Crown, but impoverishs the caselaw. 
118 Chester v Bateson l KB [1920] 829 
119 Bill of Rights 1688 Ecclesiastical courts illegal-
That the commission for erecting the late court of 
commissioners for ecclesiastical causes and all other 
commissions and courts of like nature are illegal and 
pernicious. 
120 
121 
Cooper 495 lines 15,16 and lines 37-39 
Cooper 484 lines 23-265 
122 New Zealand Drivers' Association v New Zealand Road 
Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374 CA at 398 
lV THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 35 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 contains no express 
guarantee of property rights. This is curious in view of the 
fact that most individual liberties historically developed 
from property rights. 123 The probable reason lies in 
political concerns over inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi 
and earlier proposals that the Bill should give the Judiciary 
the power to strike down legislation as unconstitutional. 124 
An equally valid explanation could be that the rights are so 
deeply engrained in the common law that it would be both 
difficult and unwise to attempt to codify them. 
Can protection of property be implied from the Bill of 
Rights 1990 as passed by Parliament? 
A Section 28 Other rights and freedoms not affected 
Section 28 of the Bill of Rights 1990 
Other rights and freedoms not affected-
An existing right or freedom shall not be held 
to be abrogated or restricted by reason only 
that the right or freedom is not included in 
this Bill of Rights or is included only in part. 
This section preserves the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Magna 
Carta legislation and preserved in the Common Law. At the 
very least they are available as aids in interpretation. 
They will influence how "reasonable'' in Section 21 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 should be interpreted. 125 
B International Covenants to which New Zealand is a State 
Signatory 
Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1947 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation .... 
123 F. Maitland "The Constitutional History of England" 
Cambridge Univ Press 1 ed at 23. 
124 Lord Cooke of Thorndon in the pref ace to Property and 
the Constitution ed Janet M'Clean first page line 27 states it 
was "because of a fear of generating disputes." 
125 Chapter 6 The Constitutional Property Clause: 
Striking a Balance Between Guarantee and Limitation 108-147 in 
Property and the Constitution ed Janet M'Lean Hart Publishing 
1999 investigates whether property should be protected in 
formal constitutions. 117-129 Andre der Walt relates the 
determination of the Supreme Court of India to interprete the 
Indian Constitution to require the payment of full 
compensation defying unambiguous constitutional amendments 
from Parliament. 
Article 17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1947 
1 Everyone has the right to own property 36 
alone as well as in association with others. 
2 No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property. 
Significantly Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights has added "property" to the wording of Article 12. It 
is reasonable to assume that Parliament intended to protect 
all (Art 12 and Art 17) property interests in the one 
provision."Unreasonable" has been substituted for "arbitrary". 
C Section 21 of the Bill of Rights 1990 
Section 21 126 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 
Unreasonable search and seizure-Everyone has 
the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure, whether of the person, 
property, or correspondence or otherwise. 
It is clear from the Parliamentary White Paper and the 
Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee that the intention of the Committee was to protect 
the privacy of the individual and to reaffirm a deeply 
established body of English and American caselaw against 
unreasonable Government search stemming from the "great" case 
of Entick v Carrington (1765) . 121 
Section 21 should not be narrowly restricted to privacy 
or law enforcement "search and seizure" in the Entick v 
Carrington sense, since those values will ultimately be 
undermined if property does not receive constitutional 
protection. Those values are an aspect of the general 
constitutional convention of property protection. This paper 
126 None of the articles on Section 21 of the Bill of 
Rights Act consider "reasonableness" in terms of the 
established common law and conventions. 
The Scope of s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: 
Does it provide a general guarantee of property rights? NZLJ 
Feb 1996 58. Andrew Butler presents the arguments on both 
sides. As an argument favouring a broad scope for Section 21 
he points to the need for the Bill of Rights to receive the 
broad interpretation mandated by the Court of Appeal. Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 429 (CA) and Noort v 
MOT;Curran v Police [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 97, 139, 141 (Cooke P) 
As arguments against he traverses the modern contextual 
background of the provision. He personally concludes that 
"the Courts should favour a narrow scope for the provision", 
but gives no reasons for this opinion. 
See also Search and Seizure: An update on s21 of 
the Bill of Rights Scott Optican [1996] NZLR 215 
121 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand A White Paper 
1985 103-107 uses the phrase "great 18th century case of 
Entick v Carrington" at para 10.145 
examines Entick v Carrington and Attorney General v Simpson 
[Baigent's case] to show that the broad interpretation of 37 
Section 21 to protect property generally is unavoidable and 
desirable. 
The issue will arise sooner rather than later since the 
Crown's liability in tort is well hedged with statutory 
immunities, while the new "independent cause of action against 
the Crown" (M' Kay J in Attorney General v Simpson 120 ) is 
clear of procedural immunity. For this reason Section 21 was 
argued by Sir Geoffrey Palmer in 1997 on behalf of the 
statutory lessees 129 and is a feature of the High Court 
proceedings filed by the Schedule 4 fishers scaled back to 80% 
of quota . 130 
D Entick v Carrington131 
Lord Camden stated the principle : 
If it is law, it will be found in our books. 
If it is not to be found there, it is not law . 
The great end, for which men entered into 
society, was to secure their property. That 
right is preserved sacred and incommunicable 
in all instances, where it has not been taken 
away or abridged by some public law for the 
good of the whole . The cases where this right 
of property is set aside by positive law, are 
various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, 
taxes . .. wherein every man by common consent 
gives up that right, for the sake of justice 
and the general good. 132 
Lord Camden is expressing the general principle 
of property guaranteed by the Magna Carta and the Bill of 
Rights 1689 in terms that echo John Locke and Blackstone. 
Property can only be taken "for the general good" "by positive 
law" and "by common consent" . 133 
120 Simpson v Attorney General [1994] 3 NZLR 667. The 
majority confirmed that the new public law remedy against the 
Crown was not fettered by statutory immunity . Seen 143. 
129 Sir Geoffrey Palmer Submissions on the Maori Reserved 
Land Amendment Act 1997 paras 201-204 at 63-65 
130 Sanford v Attorney General CP /99 Para 40 . 3 annexed 
to Submission 6 8 99 of Mr Tim Castle Barrister to the Primary 
Production Select Committee. Discussed later at VIIIB 44. 
131 
132 
Entick v Carrington 19 St Tr (1765) 1030 
Entick v Carrington 1067 lines 3-17 
13 3 Entick v Carrington "Common consent" refers to 
Parliament and echoes John Locke's thinking that an elected 
Parliament was the contractual means by which the citizen 
could express his will. 
Cannon Brewery, De Keyser, Burmah Oil and Cooper 38 
perpetuate the established tradition of the common law in 
searching for the unequivocal language of the positive law, 
before accepting there must be an uncompensated taking. 
Lord Camden continues: 
By the laws of England, every invasion of private 
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. 
No man can set foot upon my ground without my 
licence, but he is liable to an action, though 
the damage be nothing; which is proved by every 
declaration in trespass, where the defendant is 
called upon to answer for bruising the grass and 
even treading upon the soil. 134 
The law of tort lies at the heart of the law of takings 
on the basis of the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, meaning where 
there is a right, there must also be a remedy. 
Again Lord Camden continues 
If he admits the fact, he is bound to shew by 
way of justification, that some positive law 
empowered or excused him. The justification is 
submitted to the judges, who are to look into 
the books; and if such a justification can be 
maintained by the text of the statute law, or 
the principles of common law. If no such 
excuse can be found or produced, the silence of 
the books is an authority against the defendant, 
and the plaintiff must have judgment. 135 
This is the traditional common law evidential 
presumption in favour of the subject, reflected in Cannon 
Brewery and the later authorities. It follows from the Magna 
Carta conviction that inherent in every (wo)man are (her)his 
person, liberty, property and customs. 
Entick v Carrington ruled that compensation of L300 
should be paid for the temporary entry on private property for 
just four hours and the removal of private papers. There is 
no logical basis for the view that the permanent occupation 
and confiscation of private land would not warrant payment of 
similiar or greater compensation. 
134 
135 
136 
Lord Camden founds his decision on Magna Carta 
..... I could have wished that upon this 
occasion the revolution had not been 
considered as the only basis of our liberty. 
The Revolution restored this constitution 
to it's first principles. It did no more. It 
did not enlarge the liberty of the subject; 
but gave it a better security. 136 
Entick v Carrington 1067 lines 17-25 
Entick v Carrington 1067 lines 25-35 
Entick v Carrington 1067 bottom -1068 line 7 
[It is part of] the ancient immemorable law of the land 31 
137 
These phrases resonate the ideas of the Ancient 
Constitution earlier discussed at III C 3 pl6 
E Attorney Generai v Simpson [Baigent's case] [1994] CA 
Each stage in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in 
Attorney-General v Simpson1 38 in developing a new public law 
remedy in damages for breach of the Bill of Rights equally 
apply to the argument that Section 21 should be acknowledged 
to protect all property rights . Within the framework of Bill 
of Rights jurisprudence the classic Cannon Brewery 
presumptions of construction would be available to expand the 
horizons of what was "unreasonable". Uncompensated 
confiscation or any taking lacking the Magna Carta protections 
of prompt due process 138 would be "unreasonable" . 
In 1991 a party of police officers made a warranted 
search of Mrs Baigent's home looking for drugs. The police 
had obtained wrong information from the local Energy Board the 
Second Defendant. It was alleged that when PC Drummond was 
informed that the address was wrong and the search illegal he 
had responded "We often get it wrong, but while we are here we 
will have a look around anyway". 
Allegations in tort of negligence in procuring the 
search warrant, trespass by entering and remaining without 
lawful justification and abuse of process/misfeasance in 
office were resisted by claims of Crown statutory irrununity. 
The Court of Appeal found that there was a new cause of 
action not in tort, but in public law against the State and 
that the statutory immunity provided in Section 6(5) of the 
Crown Proceedings Act and elsewhere did not apply . The Court 
found that monetary compensation was the appropriate remedy 
for an innocent person ("somewhat less than $70,000" was 
indicated by Cooke P). Gault J dissented and argued that the 
remedy should be in tort rather than creating a new public law 
remedy. To this end he stated that leave should be granted to 
recast the allegations in tort to be outside the immunities. 
The decision of Cooke P contains elements common to 
all the majority judgments : 
1 
137 
In previous Bill of Rights cases I have 
tried to emphasise the importance of a 
straightforward and generous approach to 
Entick v Carrington 1068 line 37 
138 Attorney General v Simpson [Baigent's case] 
NZLR 667; (1994) 1 HRNZ 42 CA. 
[1994] 3 
138 280 Edw 111 1354 250 Edw. Stat . 5 c 4-10 1351 
Anno 420 Edward, 111. A.D. 1368 
2 
3 
4 
the provisions of the Act ... . MOT v Noort; 
Police v Curran. 139 
By it's Long Title the Act is :"(a) to 
affirm, protect, and promote human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand" 
[and (b) to affirm New Zealand's corrunitment 
to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights] 140 
[Article 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 provides that 
40 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity 
(b) .. . to develop the possibilities of judicial 
remedy. 
(c) . .. to ensure that the competant authorities 
shall enforce such remedies when granted] . 141 
. . . . international authority ... that the redress 
of breaches of affirmed human rights is a field 
of it's own. Compensation awarded against the 
State for such breaches by State servants, 
agents or instrumentalities is a public law 
remedy and not a vicarious liability for tort. 
Thus in Maharaj v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago 
[1979) JC ... cases to similiar effect ... in 
j udgment of Hardie Boys J. 142 
Attorney General v Simpson [Baigent's case] 
139 1 Cooke P 676 ln 1 - 5 Casey J 690 ln 35-47 
Compare Hardie Boys J 703 1-25 "a rights centred approach" 
140 
141 
2 Cooke P 
Hardie Boys 
676 ln 34 
699 ln 15-22 
Casey J 692 ln 11-14 
M'Kay J 717 ln 46-55 
3 Cooke P 676 ln 34 Casey J 690 ln 56 - 691 ln 10 
Hardie Boys J 699 ln 28 - 37 
M'Kay J 718 ln 4-12 
142 4 Cooke P 677 ln 26 - 35 Casey J 692 ln 1-37 
Hardie Boys J 699 ln 37 and following 
At 699 ln 50 he quotes from Valasquez Rodriguez 
"It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence 
has considered "even a general principle of law", that every 
violation of an international obligation which results in harm 
creates a duty to make adequate reparation [by] compensation." 
M'Kay J 718 ln 36 
Crown Immunity does not apply to the Public Law Remedy 
5 Section 3 of the New Zealand Act ... "otherwise 
specially provides" within the meaning of s5(k) 41 
of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 . . . [and] 
applies to acts done by the Courts. 143 
[Section 5(k) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
provides that "No ... Act shall in any manner affect the rights 
of [Her Majesty .. ] ... unless it is stated therein that [Her 
Majesty] shall be bound thereby]. 
F Law Commission Report 37: Crown Liability and Judicial 
Liability and Judicial Immunity a response to Baigent's case 
and Harvey v Derrick 
The Law Commission report on Crown Liability was 
published in 1997 and clearly reflects the thinking of the 
Judiciary through the Commission's President Justice 
Baragwanath, who decided Cooper. The Law Commission provides 
the Judiciary with the opportunity to influence the formation 
of new legislation . The report (inter alia) recommends : 
1 No legislation should be introduced to remove the 
general remedy for breach of the Bill of Rights Act held to be 
available in Baigent 's case . 144 
2 Parliament should also not intervene to codify the 
principles, which would best be developed by the Judiciary . 145 
3 Under Section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights the Crown 
should be liable for all breaches of the Executive eg 
Government Departments. 146 
4 Under Section 3(b) the Crown should be liable for the 
acts of persons performing "public functions" to the extent 
that it was a party to the relevant conduct. 147 
5 There should be a systematic review of existing 
legislation conferring immunity on Crown Agencies not enjoyed 
by citizens. These immunities should be kept to the minimum. 148 
6 The present immunity from suit of High Court Judges 
should be extended to District Court Judges. 149 
The Law Commission Report suggests that the Judiciary 
recognise that the new Bill of Rights action (not a tort) may 
develop as a useful judicial check on the power of the 
Executive if Parliament does not intervene . 
143 5 Cooke P 676 ln 38-42 Casey J 691 ln 56 
Hardie Boys 701 ln 28-40 
M'Kay J 718 ln 40 - 50 
144 Law Commission Report 3 7 "Crown Liability and 
Judicial Immunity A response to Baigent's case and Harvey v 
Derrick"at at 2 para 4 
145 Law Commission Report 37 at 25 line 4 para 4 
146 Law Commission Report 37 at 2 
147 Law Commission Report 37 para 4 at 2 
148 Law Commission Report 37 para 4 at 2 
149 Law Commission Report 37 para 4 at 2 
VI STATUTORY PROVISION IN NEW ZEALAND FOR LAND : THE 
PUBLIC WORKS ACT 1981 
42 
The law of compensation for takings of land in New 
Zealand has been settled for many years. The English Rules 
caselaw from the House of Lords and Privy Council has shaped 
the Public Works Act 1981 and its daily administration. 
The pattern of statutory provision in England 
falling into three periods, described by Lord Dunedin in De 
Keyser1 50 was also true for New Zealand. 
Lord Dunedin described a second period with a series 
of statutes of a local character authorising the taking of 
lands and assessment of compensation for particular works. In 
New Zealand that period ended in 1876 on the passing of the 
Public Works Act. The Schedule to the Public Works Act of 
1876 lists 3 pages of specific legislation repealed. 
The third period in England began with the (UK) Land 
Clauses Consolidated Act 1845 and successive legislation not 
directed to the acquisition of particular lands. Similiarly 
general provision commenced in New Zealand with the Public 
Works Act 1876. 
The practical work of valuation for Public Works 
purposes is typically completed by Valuers familiar only with 
the small text "Land Compensation" by Squire L Speedy and the 
two Casebooks published by the New Zealand Valuers ' Institute . 
(M'Veagh and Babe Land Valuation Case Book and Land Valuation 
Cases 1965-1992). 
Issues not resolved by negotiation can be referred 
to the Land Valuation Court, a division of the District Court. 
There are further rights of appeal to the Administrative 
Division of the High Court . 
The Government has been reluctant to extend the 
settled regime of the Land Valuation Tribunal and the English 
Rules to property, which is not land. 
151 In terms of the 
constitution all takings should however be equally 
compensated, irrespective of their nature . It appears that 
the Government considers that the English Rules are too 
150 Attorney General v De Keyser' s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 
508 Lord Dunedin 524 lines 20-34 discussed above VB 19. 
151 Access to the Land Valuation Tribunal was reluctantly 
conceded to the statutory lessess under the Maori Reserved 
Lands Act 1997. 
It has never been proposed for the Schedule 4 Fishers 
losing 20% of their fishing rights. 
It is only available under the Resource Management Act 
1991 under s197 (heritage orders) and s237H by s124 of the 
Resource Management Amendment Act 1993 (esplanade strips) . 
It was proposed by officials, but rejected for S162A of 
the Biosecurity Act 1997 introducing compensation. 
generous to the citizen. 152 The only logical distinction 43 
between land and other forms of property is that the Landowner 
has the sole occupation to the exclusion of all others (as 
well as use rights) and so is in a stronger tactical position 
than the State. At a theoretical level moreover land rights 
are reserved fundamental rights to which Parliamentary 
supremacy is subject . 153 
VII STATUTORY PROVISION IN NEW ZEALAND FURTHER EXAMPLES 
Lord Dunedin in De Keyser 154 stated that 
"universal practice of payment resting on bargain 
and on statutory power and provision after 1708." 
examples given below however demonstrate that 
there was a 
before 1708, 
The 
1 Where there is no political pressure statutory 
provision invariably cuts back or excludes the compensation 
that would be payable at common law. In this respect many of 
the compensation provisions are functionally similar to 
Manufacturers' warranties, which belie their names and are 
intended to remove rights available under Consumer Protection 
legislation . 
2 Official advice is rarely based on the legitimacy of 
property rights (inherent in the individual) and never on the 
Magna Carta based common law duty to compensate. The Bill of 
Rights 1990 is never mentioned. Policy is driven by fiscal 
expediency. 
3 Some policy advice on pragmatic grounds accepts 
however that compensation is an inevitable expectation and 
encourages useful cooperation by individuals. The amendment 
to the Biosecurity Act 1997 is a good example of this. 
A Statutory lessees under the Maori Reserved Land Act 
The National lead Administration proposed by statute 
to remove the right of perpetual renewal and reduce the review 
term of the statutory leases from 21 years to 7 years . The 
lessees represented by Sir Geoffrey Palmer argued for 
152 Whangarei District Council v FP Snow AP 3/96 HC 
Cartwright J. The District Council and Valuer General argued 
whether compensation of 50% x $10,800 land value paid to Mr 
Snow a subdividing Farmer compelled to lose an esplanade strip 
along a river was excessive, after first paying Mr Snow. Mr 
Snow of course did not appear in Court. In his absence the 
Court declared that he should only have been paid 33% 
153 Janet MI Lean in Property as Power and Resistance Chap 
1 of Property and the Constitution Hart Pub 1999 discusses the 
Roman law distinction between Imperium public government and 
Dominium the power of ownership. Possession of land inevitably 
creates elements of imperium in the landowner . 
154 Attorney General v De Keyser' s Royal Hotel Limited 
(1920] AC 508 Lord Dunedin 524 lines 20-34 
compensation on the basis of Blackstone, Crown Law opinion 44 
on fishing permits MAF 042/143, Section 21 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, international law and legitimate 
expectation. 155 
A tractor convoy travelled to Wellington . In the 
face of that pressure and a pending by election the Maori 
Reserved Land Amendment Act 1997 as passed provided 
compensation to the lessees and solatium payments to both 
Lessors and Lessees "as if the Act had not been enacted. 11 156 
Compensation for loss to the market value of the lessee's 
interest could be decided by the Land Valuation Tribunal. 
B Fisheries Act 
Sections 28 OF to 28 00 of the Fisheries Act 
provide a compensation regime to accomodate the Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Settlement Act 1992 requiring 20% of new 
fish quota to automatically pass to the Maori . Government 
assurances were given to Fishers at the time of the "Sealord 
deal" that they would not be prejudiced. 
The Bill before Parliament proposes to grant quota 
property rights to 80% of the Schedule 4 (non quota) species 
in exchange for their present right under fishing permits to 
catch 100% of these species. No compensation is proposed. 
22 representative fishers have now filed High Court 
proceedings through Chapman Tripp. 157 Interestingly Sealord 
Products Ltd and Moana Fisheries Ltd, both Maori companies are 
among the plaintiffs. Claim is made on the basis of : 
1 Assurances (para 26) given to the Industry at the 
time, affirmed by subsequent actions (para 32) and relied upon 
by the Industry (para 35). 
2 A Crown fiduciary obligation (para 36) "in 
settling, and in implementing the settlement of, claims 
brought by Maori as a consequence of breaches by the Crown of 
the Treaty of Waitangi". 
-not to mislead or deceive third parties 
- to act honourably and in good faith 
-to act in a manner consistent with the principles and spirit 
of the Treaty of Waitangi when dealing with the rights and 
interests of third parties potentially affected by a proposed 
settlement, one such principle being that "it is out of 
keeping with the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi that the 
resolution of one injustice should be seen to create another" . 
3 The "compulsor[y] acquisition proposal", is 
contrary to assurances,in breach of fiduciary obligation and 
155 Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee 
156 A Guide to the Maori Reserved Land Amendment Act 1997 
Pub Te Puni Kokiri 13 
157 A copy of the proceedings is annexed to the 
submission of 6 8 99 of Barrister Mr Tim Castle to the Primary 
Production Select Committee . 
contrary to section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990. 
45 
Declarations are sought that 
-in the absence of express legislation to the contrary, the 
Crown has an obligation to act in a manner consistent with the 
assurances 
-fiduciary obligation 
-the Crown's compulsory acquisition proposal would amount to 
an unreasonable seizure of the plaintiff's property contrary 
to Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
C Timber 
In 1990 the Customs Regulations were changed to 
prohibit the export of native timber. Logging native timber 
was made uneconomic . Although no right to compensation was 
conceded, limited ex gratia adjustment assistance was paid to 
Forest Owners and Contractors, who could show evidence of 
contractual commitments. The total paid of $30 million has 
preserved 1.3 million hectares of privately owned native 
forest from logging. 158 A relatively small amount of 
"compensation" has proved to be an effective policy tool. In 
1993 the Forest Amendment Act outlawed the unsustainable 
logging of native forest . 159 
D Resource Management Act 
Failure to provide statutory compensation in the 
Resource Management Act has destroyed the credibility of the 
Act and with it Landowner support for many of its purposes. 
160 The proposed reforms do not address the structural 
imbalance , caused by the lack of a compensation provision . 
Section 32 cost benefit analysis does not work as intended. 
161 
158 Mr Mike Jebson Ministry of Forestry 
159 Adjustment assistance is also to be paid under the 
Forest amendment Bill 1999 (clause 26) to the owners of "South 
Island Landless Natives" land (SILNA) following their 
successful High Court action CP140/97 9/6/99 to challenge the 
export ban under the Customs Regulations affecting them . Wild 
J declared the Regulations to be repugnant to the SILNA 
exemption in S67A Forests Act 1949 . 
16° Federated Farmers eg Federation letter of 30 June 
1998 to the Minister for the Environment objecting to the need 
for the "organisation to have to commit a minimum of $700,000 
of staff costs each year to help protect farmers from the 
excesses of the district and regional planning processes." 
161 Analysis of submissions on Proposals for Amendment to 
the Resource Management Act for the Minister for the 
Environment March 1999 Mfe 
See discussion in Think Piece Owen M'Shane 30-40 and 
critiques by R Nixon 7 Ken Tremaine 5 - 7 Guy Salmon 6th section 
unnumbered urging economic incentives. 
Report of the Minister for the Environment's Reference 
Instead the National Administration has directed DOC to 46 
withdraw from all environmental advocacy except where the DOC 
estate ( eg a National Park) is directly involved. 162 
Compensation a dirty word for some in the 
environmental movement is now being repackaged as "economic 
incentives". Guy Salmon writing in Maruia Pacific : 163 
Rural demands for compensation have arisen, 
ironically, because of the Government's own 
fiscal meaness about incentives for nature 
conservation. For many years, Maruia has 
been pressing for financial incentives to 
encourage landowners to implement voluntary 
protection and management of native forest. 
Federated Farmers have asked that the present heritage 
provisions Sections 187 - 198 of the Resource Management Act be 
used to protect on farm amenity values. These require Councils 
to acquire heritage sites if they are to be preserved . 164 The 
principle of equality before the law dictates that Rural 
Landowners should receive equal treatment to Urban Landowners 
regulated in the use of heritage or historic sites . 165 
VI 
A 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions on the law 
There is in New Zealand a Common Law duty for the 
Crown to compensate, whenever it takes an individual or 
property right. At the margin this has in recent times been 
expressed as the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the subject 
and the concommitant duty to consider all legitimate 
expectations. This duty is part of New Zealand's written 
Constitution expressed in the Magna Carta and Bill of Rights 
legislation . 
The duty to compensate extends to regulatory takings. 
Group Sept 1998 Appendix Philip Donnelly "Rationale for 
Introducing Compensation for Land Use Controls" 1-19 . 
162 A senior DOC Planning Officer to the writer . 
163 Maruia Pacific Nov 98 at 5 col 2 lines 3-11, 35-41 
and 12-13 See also on economic incentives 
Maruia Pacific June 1998 8 col 2 ln 29 - 33 and 9 col 3 ln 6 
164 Federated Farmers' 
- Submission to the Ministry for the Env ironment on Land Use 
Control under the Resource Management Act 30 June 1998 
-Submission to Ministry for the Environment on Proposals for 
Amendment to the Resource Management Act 1991 29 Jan 1999 
- Federated Farmers Presentation to the Government Agriculture 
Caucus 27 May 1999. 
165 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Arts 2 and 
21(2) to which New Zealand is a State Signatory 
The dictum of Holmes Jin Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon ll.§. 47 
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognised as a 
taking" has been approved by the House of Lords in Belfast 
Corporation v OD Cars 167 and the Privy Council . 16 0 
The test for excess regulation has been described by 
the Privy Council as "constructive deprivation" when by "lack 
of any provision for compensation [statutory restrictions] do 
not achieve a fair balance between the interests of the 
cormnunity and the rights of the individuals whose property 
interests are adversely affected". 169 The philosophy can be 
traced to John Locke. On many occasions a remedy in judicial 
review might also be available since such regulation may lack 
a public purpose. Regulation under the Resource Management 
Act as delegated legislation is especially subject to this 
caselaw . 
It is inevitable that Section 21 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights 1990 "unreasonable search and seizure" will be 
recognised as the constitutional authority for compensation, 
since "unreasonableness" will be interpreted in the light of 
Common Law conventions for compensation. The cause of action 
is attractive, because statutory immunity does not apply. It 
is uncertain whether the Court of Appeal will extend its 
ruling in Attorney General v Simpson that immunity clauses 
will not protect the Crown to unequivocal directions from 
Parliament not to compensate. 
Taking in terms of Magna Carta 1297 includes all 
acquisition, tort or exercise of statutory powers harming the 
rights or property of the subject. It can include indirect 
effect without gain to the Crown. 110 
The concept of property is broad. Historically in 
terms of Magna Carta 1215 or 1297 it includes "Liberties" and 
" free customs" . Property as a bundle of compensatable rights 
includes : (1) use rights (2) exclusion rights 
(3) rights of free disposition 111 The High Court of 
166 
167 
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon (1922) 260 US 393 , 417. 
Belfast Corporation v OD Cars (1960] AC 490 519 ln19 
16 8 Sucriere de Bel Ombre v Mauritius Government (1995] 3 
LRC 507 AT 502 h-i . 
169 Sucriere de Bel Ombre v Mauritius Government [1995] 3 
LRC 494 505 a. See also Newcrest 133 30-35. 
110 See 27 and n 79 Manitoba Fisheries v The Queen (1979] 
1 SCR 101, 110-118 Taking includes depriving without gain to 
the Crown. Compensation may be paid for partial takings. 
11 1 Takings RA Epstein n78 74-92 discusses this 
generally. The right of free disposition is described as 
"Adjoining owner potentiality" in the English Rules. 
Inland Revenue Corrunissioners v Clay [1914] 3KB 466. 
Australia recently in Yanner(1999) 112 drew upon the work 48 
of Professor Gray and described property as "a legal 
relationship with a thing" and "legally endorsed concentration 
of power over things and resources". 
B Recommendations for Pariiamentary reform 
Property rights legally protected by the Bill of 
Rights 1689 and philosophically justified by John Locke are 
the primary constitutional defence of the liberties delivered 
by the Westminster Model of democracy. Recent statutory 
reform such as the Resource Management Act and the Fisheries 
Act has been heavily influenced by public choice economic 
theory. The promised efficiency gains from rationally 
assessing costs and benefits will not be fully realised until 
Community attitudes toward property rights change. 1 73 It is 
Parliament's responsibility to achieve that by ensuring that 
full compensation is readily obtained whenever takings occur. 
The cost of compensation now payable is a fraction of the 
transaction cost in excessive regulation. 
Community attitudes toward property rights are more 
important than specific changes in the law. The following 
proposals for changes to statute will assist that: 
1 The NZ Bill of Rights should be amended to clearly 
protect property rights so that all uncompensated takings and 
Crown immunities will in future have to be reported to 
Parliament by the Attorney General in terms of S7 of the NZ 
Bill of Rights. 
2 Parliamentary Standing Orders should be amended to 
require all legislation to be scrutinised for takings of 
private property interests and unjustified immunities. The 
onus should always be on the Crown to clearly and publicly 
justify a failure to compensate. That would bring Executive 
practice in Parliament into line with the existing conventions 
and New Zealand's international obligations. 
3 The Resource Management Act should be amended to 
expressly provide for compensation. Compensation should be 
paid, when resource consent is refused and there are no 
significant effects on others. The test of "significant 
effects" would accord with existing caselaw on notification in 
terms of Section 94 of the Act. 
112 Yanner v Eaton n46 para 17 line 2 para 18 line 4 
See also matrimonial cases National Provincial Bank v 
Ainsworth (1965] 1175 per Lord Wilberforce at 1247 and 
z v z (1997] 2 NZLR 258 CA full bench where property included 
non assignable interests, but not future earning capacity. 
ACTV v Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 108 ALR 577 
Ex parte Menaling Station Pty Ltd (1982) CLR 327 
"transferrability is not an essential element of the concept." 
113 A Regulatory Responsibility Act and Regulatory Impact 
Statements [CO (98)5 12 May 1998] recently proposed by the Hon 
Mr J Luxton Minister of Commerce would be unnecessary if all 
takings were promptly recognised and compensated. 
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f]ACNA CARTA 
i..ECl ~ Lffil ON EX PR£S5l~ ~RESERUfD IN IMPERIAL LAL\)S APPL\C!iTIDN OCT 
I q<as> SCH EDUlf l 
3° EDvVARDI, I. A.l).1Q75 
1~qtt"s. ~ r-i ?.~~':.r--
o~ ~~hc.\es 3Cfo,.J 
40 ~ \tQ,~ N~ 
ein~ ,::i i5 
FIRST the King willeth and commandeth, That the 
Peace of Huly Church and of the Land, be well kept 
and maintained in all points, and that common Rig~!. 
be done to a!1 as well Poor as Rich, without respect 
of Persons. 
25° Eow. I. Jliagna Carta, . c. 2!J 
NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be dis-
seised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, 
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; 
nor will We not pass upon him, nor [ condemn him/ J 
but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of 
the Land. ,ve will sell to no man, we will not deny 
or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 
ITEM, That no Man of what Estate or Condition 
that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor 
taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to 
Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process 
of the Law. 
XXIX. 
Imprison-
ment. &c. 
contrary to 
Law. 
A<lministra· 
tion of 
Justice . , 
III. 
None al,all be 
condemned 
without <lue 
Procell of 
!dw. 
215° Enw lll. Stat.5. '"' 4-10 \~Sl 
ITEM, Whereas it is contained in the GreJt Charter 
of the Franchises of England, that none shall be impri-
soned nor put out of his Freehold, 11or of his Franchises 
nor free Custom, unless it be by the Law of the Land ; 
It is accorded assented, and stablished, That from hence-
forth none shall be taken by Petition or Suggestion 
made to our Lord the King, or to his Council, unless 
it be by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful 
People of the same neighbourhood where such Deeds 
be done, in due Manner, or by Process made by '\Vrit 
original at the Common Law ; nor that none be out of 
his Franchises, nor of his Fr~eholc!.1i, unless he be duly 
brought into answer, and forejudged of the same by 
the Course of the Law; and if any thing be done 
against the same, it shall _l>_e redresseed and holden 
for none. - ----
IV. 
None ,h~ll 
he taken upo1 
S~ggestion 
without 
lawful 
Presentment 
nor Jisfran. 
chised, but 
by Course 
of Law. 
Anno 42,° ED,VARD I, III. A.D.1368. 
III. 
None shall be 
put to answer 
without due 
Process of 
Law. 
ITEM, At the Request of the Commons by their 
Petitions put forth in this Parliament, to eschew the 
Mischiefs and Damages done to divers of his Commons 
by false Accusers, which oftentimes have made their 
Accusations more for Revenge and singular Benefit, 
than for the Profit of the King, or of his People, which 
accused Persons, some have been taken, and [some-
time '] caused to come before the King's Council by 
Writ, and otherwise upon grievous Pain against the 
Law : It is assented and accorded, for the good Go-
vernance of the Commons, that no Man be put to 
answer · without Presentment before Justices, or Matter 
of Record, or by due Process and Writ original, ac-
c9rding to ~he old Law of the Land : And if any T~-
from henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall pe 
~clJwLden for J:r.1or .. 
'- · 
: '-! 
J 
R! ~t-rrs I 6 8'l [,·€ assecl ; ,.. IG G'9 f)S Yet ncvcrthclcssc of late divers comissions direc ted t_o sundry 
R~PORT'~D B~ t.AW coNM\SSION RtPoRT NO I 
ti)lTH MISSIN~ P8R'TS AUDED [i~ hatJ!1ot-·;f,,a.~J 
cOmissioncrs in scverall counties with instruccions h ave issued, by 
meanes whereof your people have been in divers places assembl~d 
and required to lend certaine somcs of mony unto your MaJcst1c, 
and many of them uppon their refusall soc to doc have had an oath 
administred unto them not warrantable by the !awes or statutes of 
this realme and have been constrayned to become bound to ma~e FROM STR1UTE5 or 'H-\E REf1L.M 
C tH\P1~ P-_ I. 
apparance and give attendance before your pnv1e councell and tn 
other places, and others of them have been therefore 1mpnsoned 
confined and sondry other waies molested and d1squ1ctcd a~d 
1\e r~tic.ior' E.r-\..ilti;iea.to \-i;~ t"lAjeslie ~'.\ik. Lo,.J.s Sf,;t\)q\t 
et!'! 1 enfo,.q,\\ q~J.. Co Mnc>N~ i"' it.;~ ~ r'e!,eNt 'Pa'"\·qner1t q S)en\:,JeJ 
cor,1c.er .. i,..~ r.b,el'.s R:1~+.s q...,J,. L; lo~i-te.!> o~it.~ 5ul,,~ecf".s : l.);-fl 
t\.e l<,t-1~p Maj e stes °RoJqll ~.,,, Swere, ~ete..""'-to ·,,. ~.,\J Pai-\iqne,-,t 
divers other charges have been laid and levied upon your PC<;>Pl_e in 
severall counties by lord lieuten•nte deputie lieutcn•nt('. com1ss1on-
ers for musters justices of peace and others by conrnund or d1rec-
cion from your Majestic or your privic councell against the !awes 
and free customes of the real me. 
3. Reciting 9 Hen. 3 M.C. c. 29 
PETITION OF RIGHT ( 1627) 
(3 Car. I c. I) 
To the King(:' most excellent Majestic. 
Humbly shew unto our sovcraigne lord the King the lord('. spiritu-
all and temporall and comons in Parliament asscmhled that 
[I.) Reciting that by (25) 34 Edw. I st. 4 c. I, by authority of 
Parliament holden 25 Edw. 3, and by other laws of this'realm, the 
King's subjects should not be taxed but by consent in Parliament '\. 
Whereas it is declared and enacted by a Statute made in the tyme 
of the raigne of King Edward the First comonly called Statutum de 
Tallagio non concedendo, that no tallage or aydc should be layd or 
lcvyed by the King or his heires in this rcalme without the good 
will and assent of the archbishopps bishopps caries barons knight{' 
burgesses and other the freemen of the comonaltie of this real me, 
and by authoritie of Parliament holden in the five and twentieth 
yeare of the raigne of King Edward the Third , it is declared and 
enacted, that from thenceforth no pson should be compelled to 
make any loanes to the King against his will because such loanes 
were against reason and the franchise of the land, and by other 
!awes of this realme it is pvided, that none should be charged by 
any charge or imposicion called a benevolence nor by such like 
charge by which the statutes before mencioncd and other the good 
!awes and statutes of this realme your subject('. have inherited this 
frcedome that they should [not'] be compelled to contribute to any 
taxc tallagc ayde or other like charge not sett by cOmon consent in · 
Parliament. 
' Interlined on the roll. 
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And where alsoe by the Statute called the Great Charter of the 
liberties of England , it is declared and en.acted , that no freeman 
may be taken or imprisoned or be d1sse1sed of h~s freehold or 
liberties or his free customes or be outlawed or exiled or in any 
manner destroyed, but by the lawfull judgment of his pccrcs or by 
the law of the land. 
4. Reciting 28 Edw. 3 c. 3 
And in the eight and twentith yeere of the raigne _o f King ~dward 
the Third, it was declared and enacted by authontte of Parltament. 
that no man of what estate or eondicion that he be, should be put 
out of his land or tenemente nor taken nor imprisoned nor disher-
ited nor put to death without being brought to aunswere by due 
pcesse of !awe. 
5. And that divers subjects have been imprisoned without cause 
1)) 0 .,J..s i'"' 'co\.l ? shewn or cause of detainer certified 
qce. M.Qt<;f No.\ Neverthelesse against the tenor of the said statutes and other the 
rc 0-\-"-t"o1.1s
1
;,J s\-~i.,b good !awes and statutes of your realme t_o that en_d pvided, divers 
r ..u \ of your subJecte have of late been tmpnsoned without any cause 
Oy \l..e, \(Q.Gl t"\ . . h b ht b r 
1411 "1,i 11.tQA. .,;;l. Ror-tq"" shewed: And when for their deltverance t ey were roug e,ore 
J, your justices by your Majesties writte of habeas corpu~ there to 
Nut~-rq_\<:, <\Aick 1_ undergoe and receive as the court should order, and their keepers 
No kqoe -tl.e, wo~ comaunded to certifie the causes of their dctayner, no cause was 
'' i-ec.:t;"''.}'' certified bttt that they were deteincd by your Majesties speciall 
comaund signified by the Jorde of your privic councell, and yet 
were returned backe to severall prisons without being charged with 
any thing to which they might make aunswere according to the 
!awe. 
'y 6. And that soldiers have been dispersed in divers counties and 
inhabitants compelled to receive them 
And whereas of late great companies of souldicrs and marriners 
have been dispersed into divers counties of the realme, and the 
inhabitant{'. against their will{'. have been compelled to rec~ive 
them into their houses, and there to suffer them to soJourne against 
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7 . Reciting 25 Edn•. 3. :and tli:at commissions l1avc issued under the 
--, great seal for proceedings according to martial law 
And whereas a lsoe by a uthori tie of Parliament in the five and 
twcntith ycare of the raigne of King Edward the Third it is 
declared and enacted that no man should be forejudged of life or 
limbe against the forme of the Great Charter and the lawe of the 
lard, and by the said Great Charter, and other lawes and statutes 
o this your realme no man ought to be adjudgecftodeath but by 
the lawes established in this your realme, either by the customes of 
the same realme or by Acte of Parliament. And whereas no 
offendor of what kinde soever is exempted from the pceedinge to 
be used and punishment(' to be inflicted by the lawes and statutes 
of this your realmc, neverthelesse of late [tyme'] divers cOmissions 
under your MaJcstics great sealc have issued forth, by which 
certaine psons have been assigned and appointed comissioners 
with power and authoritie to pceed within the land according to 
the justice of martiall lawe against such souldiers or marriners or 
other dissolute psons joyning with them as should comitt any 
murther robbery felony mutiny or other outrage or misdemeanor 
whatsoever, and by such sumary course and order as is agreeable 
to martiall !awe and as is used in armies in tyme of warr to ·pceed 
to the tryall and condcmnacion of such offenders, and them to 
cause to be executed and putt to death according to the lawe 
martial!. 
By ptest whereof some of your Majesties subject( have been by 
some of the said comissioners put to death, when and where, if by 
the lawes and statute of the land they had deserved death, by the 
same lawes and statute alsoc they might and by no otherought to 
have byn judged and executed. 
And alsoe sundrie greivous offcndors by colour thereof clayming 
an exempcion have escaped the punishmente due to them by the 
!awes and statutes of this your realme, by reason that divers of 
your officers and ministers of justic have unjustlie refused or for-
borne to pcecd against such offendors according to the same lawes 
and statutes uppon ptence that the said offendors were punishable 
onelie by martiall law and by authoritie of such comissions as 
aforesaid. Which comissions and all other of like nature are wholly 
and directlie contrary to the said lawes and statutes of this your 
realme. 
~ 8. The petition 
They doc therefore humblie pray your most excellent Majestic, 
that no man hereafter be compelled to make or yeild any gu.ift 
Joane benevolence taxc or such like char e without comon consent 
5y c e o ar 1ament , and that none be ea cd to make aunswere 
or take such oath or to gi vc attendance or be confined or otherwise 
molested or disquieted concerning the same or for refusall thereof. 
And that no freeman in any such manner as is before mencioncd 
be imprisoned or det eined. And that your Majestic would be 
' lnlcrlincd on the ro ll. 
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ar<e>re s uicl c Omt 1.0.-.s or p c cc '- ""S Y 1,"T"1.ar~1.a. awe T,.:'U.-Y r --v c 
a nd a nnulle d . And th a t hereaft e r n o co m1ss1o n s o f like n a ture n rny 
issue fo rth to a ny pson or psons whatsoever t_O b_c ex.cc~ted as 
aforesa id lest by colour of them any of your Ma1est1 es sub1ec1e be 
destroyed or put to death contrary to the I awes and franchise of the 
land . 
All which they most humblie pray of your most excellent Majes-
tic as their right( and liberties according to the !awes and statutes 
of this realme, and that your Majestic would alsoc vo~chsafc to 
declare that the awardf doing(' and pcecdings to the pJud1cc of 
your people of any of the pmisses shall not be drawen hereafter 
into consequence or example. And that your MaJest1e would be 
alsoe graciouslie pleased for the further comfort and safet1c of your 
people to declare your royall wil! and pleasure , that in the thmge 
aforesaid all your officers and ministers shall serve you according 
to the !awes and statutes of this real me as they tender the honor of 
your Ma1est1e and the prosperitie of this kingdome. 
Qua quidem peticoe tea & plenius intectt a p oci:1 c.tnm regem 
taliP est responsum in pleno parhamcn!o v1deft t. 
R O , Soit droit fait come est desire . 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1688) 
( I Will & Mar sess 2 c 2) 
An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject and Setleing the Succession of the Crowne 
Whereas the lords spirituall and temporall and conrnns assem-
bled at Westminister lawfully fully and freely representing all the 
estates of the people of this real me did upon the _thirteenth day of 
February in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty 
eight present unto their Majesties then cal(ed and kno~n by the 
names and stile of William and Mary Prince an? Pnncesse_ of 
Orange being present in their proper persons a ~ertaine declaration 
in writeing made by the said lords and comons in the words follow-
ing viz 
The heads of declaration of lords and con_1mons, 
recited-Whereas the late King James the Second by the ass1sta1~cc 
of diverse evill councillors judges and ministers imploye? _by him 
did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and 
the !awes and liberties of this kingdome. 
Dispensing and suspending power-By assumeing and 
exerciseing a power of dispensing with and suspending of !awes 
and the execution of !awes without consent of Parlyament. 
Committing prelates-By committing and prosecuting diverse 
worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused from concur-
ring to the said assumed power. 
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I Le.-y ing money- B y l evying money fo r a nd to th e use o f the C ro wnc by p re ten ce of preroga ti ve fo r o ther time in o ther manner 
then the same was gra nted by Parlyament. 
Standing army-By raising and keeping a standing army within 
this kingdome in time of peace without consent of Parlyament and 
quartering soldiers contrary to law. 
Disarming Protestants, etc-By causing serverall good subjects 
being protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists 
were both armed and imployed contrary to law. 
Violating elections-By violating the freedome of election of 
members to serve in Parlyament. 
Illegal prosecutions-By prosecutions in the Court of Kfog's 
Bench for matters and causes cognizable onely in Parlyament and 
by diverse other arbitrary and illegall courses. 
Juries-And whereas of late yeares partiall corrupt and unquali-
fyed persons have beene returned and served on juryes in tryalls 
and particularly diverse jurors in tryalls for high treason which 
were not freeholders . 
Excessive bail-And excessive baile hath beene required of per-
sons committed in criminall cases to elude the benefitt of the !awes 
made for the liberty of the subjects. 
Fines-And excessive fines have beene imposed. 
Punishments-And illegall and cruel! punishments inflicted. 
Grants of fines, etc, before conviction, etc-And se_verall grants 
and promises made of fines and forfeitures before a~y conviction 
or judgement against the persons upon whome the same were to be 
levyed. 
All which are utterly and directly contrary to the knowne !awes 
and statutes and freedome of this realme. 
And whereas the said late King James the Second haveing abdi-
ca_ted the govern_ment and the throne being thereby vacant his 
H1ghnesse the Pnnce of Orange (whome it hath pleased Almighty 
God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdome 
fr~n:1 papery and arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the lords 
spmtuall and temporall and diverse principall persons of the com-
mons) cause letters to be written to the lords spirituall and 
temporall being protestants and other letters to the severall 
countyes cityes universities boroughs and cinque ports for the 
choosmg of such persons to represent them as were of right to be 
sent to Parlyament to meete and sitt at Westminster upon the two 
and twentyeth day of January in this yeare one thousand six hun-
dred eighty and eight in order to such an establishment as that 
their religion !awes and liberties might not againe be in danger of 
being subverted, upon which letters elections haveing beene · 
accordingly made. 
The subject's Rights-And thereupon the said lords spirituall 
and temporall and commons pursuant to their respective letters 
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{h;ir a uncest ors in like case have u s u a lly_ d o n _c) f o r the v indic ating 
and asserting their a untien t rights a n d hbert1es, d ecl a re . 
[I) Suspending power- That the pretended p<_>wer _of suspend mg 
of Jaws or the execution of Jaws by regall authonty without consent 
of Parlyament is illegall. . . 
Late dispensing power-That the pretended power_ o_f dispensing 
with laws or the execution of Jaws by i:cgall authont1e as 1t hath 
beene assumed and exercised of late 1s 1llegall. . 
Ecclesiastical courts illegal-That the c~mn:iission for erecting 
the late court of commissioners for ecclesiast1call cau~es and all 
other commissions and courts of like nature are 11legal and 
pernicious. 
Levying money-That levying money for or to the use of the 
Crowne by pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for 
longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted 
is illegal. .. 
Right to petition-That it is the right of t~e subjects to pe~1~1on 
the King and all commitments and prosecutions for such pet1t10n-
ing arc illegal. . 
Standing army-That the raising or keepi~g a s~andmg army 
within the kingdome in time of peace unlcsse 1t be with consent of 
Parlyament is against law. 
s bject's arms-That the subjects which arc protestants may 
hav~ arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as 
allowed by law. 
Freedom of election-That election of members of Parlyament 
ought to be free. 
Freedom of speech-That the freedome of s~eech and debates or 
proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or ques-
tioned in any court or place out of Parlyament. 
Excessive bail-That excessive baile ought not to be _required 
nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel! and unusuall pumshments 
inflicted. 
Juries-That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned 
I 
· . ~rants or" forfeitures-That all grants and ~r~miscs o'. fines and 
forfeitures of particular persons before conv1ct1on are 11legal and 
void . 
Frequent Parliaments-And th~t for redressc ~f all grievances 
and for the amending strengthenmg and prcscrvemg of the !awes 
Parlyaments ought to be held frequently. 
The said right claimed, tender of the crown, r~gal power exer-
cised, limitation of the crown, new oaths of alleg1ance, etc-And 
, The words omillcd were repealed by the Juries Act 1825. 6 Geo. 4, c.50, s.62. 
45 
-.J ,... c, r1s c:,r prc,cee .,..8 re, t.h pre u c c c::,, t 11c 
people in any or the said premisses ought in any wise to be drawne 
hereafter into consequence or example. To which demand of their 
rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his 
Highnesse the Prince of Orange as being the only meanes for 
obtaining a full redresse and remedy therein. Haveing therefore an 
\ in tire confidence that his said Highnesse the Prince of Orao&e will 
erfect the deliverance soe farr advanced b him and will · I 
preserve them rom the violation of their ri ts whi 
an I ert1es. e sa1 or s sp1rituall and temporall and commons 
assembled at Westminster doe resolve that William and Mary 
Prince and Princesse of Orange be and be declared King and 
Queene of England France and Ireland and the dominions there-
unto belonging to hold the crowne and royall dignity of the said 
kingdomes and dominions to them the said prince and princesse 
dureing their lives and the life of the survivour of them. And that 
the sole and full exercise of the regall power by onely in and 
executed by the said Prince of Orange in the names of the said 
prince and princesse dureing their joynt lives and after their 
deceases the said crowne and royall dignitie of the said kingdoms 
and dominions to be to the heires of the body of the said princesse 
and for default of such issue to the Princesse Anne of Denmarke 
and the heires of her body and for default of such issue to the 
heires of the body of the said Prince of Orange. And the lords 
spirituall and temporall and commons doe pray the said prince 
and princesse to accept the same accordingly. And that the oathes 
hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whome the oathes 
of allegiance and supremacy might be required by Jaw ~nstead of 
them and that the said oathes of allegiance and supremacy be 
abrogated. ·· 
I A B doe sincerely promise and sweare that I will be faithful/ and 
beare true allegiance to their Majestyes King William and Queene 
Mary 
Sae helpe me God 
I A B doe sweare that I doe from my heart abhorr, detest and abjure 
as impious and heretical/ this damnable doctrine and position that 
princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope or any authority of 
the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or 
any other whatsoever. And I doe declare that noe forreigne prince 
person prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdic-
tion power superiority preeminence or authoritie ecclesiastical/ or 
spiritual/ within this realme. 
Sae helpe me God. [virtually repealed.] 
Acceptance of the crown, the two Houses to sit, subjects' liberties 
to be allowed, and ministers hereafter to serve according to the 
same, William and Mary declared King and Queen, limitation of the 
crown, papists debarred the crown, every King, etc, shall make the 
declaration of 30 Car 2, if under 12 years old, to be done after 
attainment thereof, King's and Queen's assent. Upon which their 
said Majestyes did accept the crowne and royall dignitie of the 
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lords and commons con'l.ai.ncd in t.he said dcc\arat.,on . A..nd \.hc'l"c-
upon their Majestyes were pleased that the said lords spiritual\ and 
temporall and commons being the two Houses of Par\yamcnt 
should continue to sitt and with their Majesties royal! concurrence 
make effeetuall provision for the setlement of the religion !awes 
and liberties of this kingdome soe that the same for the future 
might not be in danger againe of being subverted , to which the said 
lords spirituall and temporall and commons did agree . and 
proceede to act accordingly. Now in pursuance of the premisses 
the said lords spirituall and temporall and commons m Parlya-
ment assembled for the ratifying confirming and establishing the 
said declaration and the articles clauses matters and things therein 
contained by the force of a law made in due forme by authority of 
Parlyament doe pray that it may be declared and ena~ted t~at all 
and singular the ri hts and liberties ass 
1 ert1es o the people of this kin dome and soe shall be esteemed 
a owe a JU ge eeme and ta en to be and that all and every 
the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly and strictly holden and 
observed as they are expressed in the said declaration. And all 
officers and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majestyes and 
their successors according to the same m all times to come. And 
the said lords spirituall and temporall and commons seriously 
considering how it hath pleased Almighty God in his marvellous 
providence and mercifull goodness to this nation to l?rovide _and 
preserve their said Majestyes royall persons most happily to ra1gne 
over us upon the throne of their auncestors for which they render 
unto him from the bottome of their hearts their humblest thanks 
and praises doe truely firmely assuredly and in the sincerity of 
their hearts thinke and doe hereby recognize acknowledge and 
declare that King James the Second haveing abdicated the govern-
ment and their Majestyes having accepted the crowne and royall 
dignity [as2 ) aforesaid their said Majesty~s did become were_ are 
and of right ought to be by the !awes of this real me our sovera1gne 
liege lord and lady King and Queene of England France and Ire-
land and the dominions thereunto belonging in and to whose 
princely persons the royall state crowne and dignity of the said 
realmes with all honours stiles titles regalities prerogatives powers 
jurisdictions and authorities to the same belonging a~d appertain-
ing are most .(ully rightfully and intirely invested an? mcorporaJe? 
united and annexed. And for preventing all questions and d1v1-
sions in this real me by reason of any pretended titles to the crowne 
and for preserveing a certainty in the succession thereof in and 
upon which the unity peace tranquillity and safety of this nation 
doth under God wholly consist and depend the said lords spirtuall 
and temporall and commons doe beseech their Majestyes that it 
may be enacted established and declared that the crowne and 
regall government of the said kingdoms and dominions with all 
and singular the premisses thereunto belonging and appertaining 
shall bee and continue to their said Majestyes and the survivour of 
them dureing their lives and the life of the survivour of them and 
'Interlined on the roll. 
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or both their .l'vZ"ajcst.yes dureing their joynt lives and after their 
deceases the said crowne and premisses shall be and remainc to the 
heires of the body of her Majestic and for default of such issue to 
her royall Highnesse the Princess Anne of Denmarke and the 
heires of her body and for default of such issue to the heires of the 
body of his said Majestic And thereunto the said lords spirituall 
and temporall and commons doe in the name of all the people 
aforesaid most humbly and faithfully submitt themselves their 
heires and posterities for ever and doe faithfully promise that they 
will stand to maintaine and defend their said Majesties and alsoe 
the limitation and succession of the crowne herein specified and 
con tamed to the utmost of their powers with their lives and estates 
against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt any thing to the 
contrary. And whereas it hath beene found by experience that it is 
inconsistent with the safety and welfaire of this protestant 
kingdome to be governed by a popish prince or by any King or 
Queene marrying a papist the said lords spirituall and temporall 
and commons doe further pray that it may be enacted that all and 
every person and persons that is are or shall be reconciled to or 
shall hold communion with the ·see or church of Rome or shall 
professe the popish religion or shall marry a papist . shall be 
excluded and be for ever uncapeable to inherit possesse or enjoy 
the crowne and government of this realme and Ireland and the 
dominions thereunto belonging or any part of the same or to have 
use or exercise any regall power authoritie or jurisdiction within 
the same [And in all and every such case or cases the people of 
these realmes shall be and are hereby absolved of their allegiance3] 
and the said crowne and government shall from time to time 
descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons being protes-
tants as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the 
said person or persons soe reconciled holding communion or pro-
fessing or marrying as aforesaid were naturally dead (And that 
every King and Queene of this realme who at any time hereafter 
shall come to and succeede in the imperiall crowne of this 
kingdome shall on the first day of the meeting of the first Parlya-
ment next after his or her comeing to the crowne sitting in his or 
her throne in the House of Peeres in the presence of the lords and 
commons therein assembled or at his or her coronation before 
such person or persons who shall administer the coronation oath 
to him or her at the time of his or her takeing the said oath (which 
shall first happen) make subscribe and audibly repeate the declara-
tion mentioned in the Statute made in the thirtyeth yeare of the 
raigne of King Charles the Second entituled An Act for the more 
effectuall preserveing the Kings person and government by disable-
ing papists from sitting in either House of Parlyament But if it 
shall happen that such King or Queene upon his or her succession 
to the crowne of this real me shall be under the age of twelve yeares 
then every such King or Queene shall make subscribe and audibly 
repeate the said declaration at his or her coronation or the first day 
of the meeting of the first Parlyament as aforesaid which shall first 
happen after such King or Queene shall have attained the said age 
1 Annexed to the original Act in a separate schedule. 
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d al s\.an rcma1.nc an c \. c aw o 
th!s present ;arhame;:: dnth; same are by their said Majesties by 
!;;td r:,~~;\h~r ;;~:ce nand consent of the lort ~piritt~y at~~ 
all nd commons in Parylament assem e an . 
~:~:;~tie a of the same declared enacted and estabhshed 
accordingly 
2 Non obstantes mad oid 
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statute .. .4 
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Ii,~ a.\lol,,)e..c\ ot aMJ. ; .. S"c.l.. S1qt,Je.- [q,.,J. ci<,ep1 irJ s., ... l, 
(a.'i>t.5' <l.'> slq\\ Sft..c.;q\\j be. f'"ouiJ.el. \ot" bj ot.ae. or t,o,,-e.,. f,;\I 
O ,- ~iQs lo loe. ri.seJ.. J .... : ... ~ ll.1<;, r r-esei1t Se, ... s,'ol'I o\ ~r-\,qne,ti ~ 
?. 0 11 l JeJ it.a--\" 1'4oe.. Cl.q,..\,... or Ciq.,t o.- ~a.-c\o,., ',-qtJ"feJ. b<!.\o,-e. 
°""~ 1\K1t. qMJ._ f ~e.,.-t ~~~ ~'lo~ Oc:.1"obe.'" i --\\.e. ~e,q,-e.. o i o 11 ,..i"' 
\..o,..j. o,.e.., -\1...ouSOMi S,)<. ~-,achq_J.. o.,..l e,,~\.-t~ ,i,t.1e... s\.o.l\ l&e. 
"'"''.\ .. o.~c.s ;,.fe.o.c~eJ.. o,-. ,,....,a.\;J..-\t..l.. 'o'j -\\.; .. ~t b~t 11.c--tite. 
Sq"e.. s\..._.\l lae... ~~ t-e...nGtiNe., o~"tt.e. 5..-.e.. ~otce. q,.J.. e\h.c.t 
i,a Lai.> q,.,J... >1ee.. o~e..r -\t.e..,.1 q, ;'- tli!. ~J- l,.,J. t.1e.ve,-.be.e...te... 
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